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Abstract 
Over the last decade, networks have become increasingly advanced in terms of size, 
complexity and the level of heterogeneity, due to increase of number of users, devices and 
implementation of cloud among big enterprises and developing smart cities. As networks 
become more complicated, the existing client-server paradigm suffers from problems such 
as delay, jitter, bad quality of service, insufficient scalability, availability and flexibility. 
The appearance of mobile agents’ technology is getting popular as means for an efficient 
way to access remote resources on computer networks. Mobile Agent- systems usually 
benefit from the following: asynchronous execution, dynamic adaptation, fault-tolerance 
improvement in network latency, protocol encapsulation, reduction in network load and 
robustness.  
 
However, one of the major technical obstacles to a wider acceptance of the mobile agent is 
security which is the modus operandi to protect the mobile agents against malicious hosts.  
 
This work proposes how the Mobile Agents (MA), supported by a new solid models 
(detection and protection), can present a new way of securing mobile agents against 
malicious hosts.  
 
The work contributes in proposing a new computing model for protection against 
malicious hosts. This model is based on trust, which is a combination of two kinds of trust: 
policy enforcement and control and punishment. The originality of this model is the 
introduction of the concept of setting up an active storage element in the agent space, 
called as “home away from home”, for partial result storage and separation as well as 
digital signing of the destination of the mobile agent. 
 
An efficient flooding detection scheme is developed by integrating the sketch technique 
with the Divergence Measures (Hellinger Distance, Chi-Square and Power Divergences). 
This type of integration can be considered unique in comparison with existing solutions 
over a Mobile Agent network. The sketch data- structure summarizes the mobile agent’s 
process of calls generating  into a fixed set of data for developing a probability model.  
IV 
The Divergence Measures techniques, combined with a Mobile Agent traffic, efficiently 
identifies attacks, by monitoring the distance between current traffic distribution and the 
estimated distribution, based on history information. Compared to the previous detection 
system and existing works, the proposed techniques achieve the advantages of higher 
accuracy and flexibility, to deal with low intensity attacks and the ability to track the 
period of attack.  
 
Simulation results are presented to demonstrate the performance of the proposed 
detection model. This work achieves in outperforming the existing detection solutions by 
tuning the Divergence Measures. An evaluation of the scheme is done via the receiver-
operating characteristic (ROC). The work achieves in outperforming the existing detection 
solutions by tuning the Power Divergence with a value of β=2.2. With this value of β, the 
detection scheme leads to a very attractive performance in terms of True Positive Rate 
(100%), False Positive Rate (3.8%) and is capable of detecting low intensity attacks. 
Moreover, the Power Divergence with β=2.2 presents a better detection accuracy of 98.1% 
in comparison with Hellinger Distance (60%) and Chi-square (80%). 
Since the scenarios in consideration in this work can be reasonably related to any type of 
network, the strength of the proposed model can alternatively be applied to any enterprise 
network. 
 
Keywords: mobile agents, malicious host, protection, detection, trusted nodes, divergence 
measures, sketch techniques, false alarm ratio, low intensity attacks. 
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 Chapter 1 : Introduction 
 
1.1. Background 
Next generation enterprises will be definitely characterized by new organizational 
structures, such as increased reliance on virtual operations and “electronically glued” 
organizations. Furthermore, it is also clear that the next-generation enterprises will have 
an increasing percentage of personnel, be they employees, suppliers or customers, who 
would use, a wide range of wireless technology, devices and the implementation of cloud, 
smart cities and internet of things. One of the key facilities personnel in next generation 
enterprises will require is the ability to efficiently retrieve, organize, manage and leverage 
information, do the job anywhere, any time; and at last saving time compared to their 
real world counterparts and knowledge from widely dispersed sources within, as well as 
from outside, viz. the virtual organization. This activity represents a significant challenge 
as it tends to require a great deal of human involvement, that increases   cost and delay 
associated with it. Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that all of these services are based on 
the traditional client server approach. 
 
Thus, any tool, technology, or alternative distributed paradigm that can help automate 
this activity has a potential for a significant payoff.  The distributed paradigm is modeled 
much like what top business-persons, famous coaches and sporting personalities are 
used to. As a single person could not manage or handle many tasks at a time, he would 
delegate part of his authority to his agent, who could autonomously make a decision on 
his behalf.  
There has been tremendous interest in the past few years in using mobile agent technology 
for next-generation enterprises. In particular, mobile agents seem have been proposed for 
automating the task of retrieving, organizing and filtering information located at widely 
dispersed sites. Mobile agent systems have been built and demonstrated, that indicate 
mobile agents can be used for information retrieval activities.  
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Any of the following questions can be considered:  
Can the mobile agent be “better” than using traditional client-server computing for 
information retrieval tasks? Yes, the answer is emphatic affirmative. The questions that 
immediately arise are: ‘what is a mobile agent? Is not the mobile agent paradigm an old 
tool?  Can mobile agent reduce the network load and thus increase the responsiveness and 
speed of the network? ‘ 
 
Due of increase in demand of applications and the number of users who wish to use 
wireless and portable devices increases significantly, it was realized that the traditional 
client-server approach was lacking in terms of bandwidth use and server flexibility, load 
balancing, availability and delay in traffic network.  
In lieu of this, a new paradigm is needed and certainly the most promising among the new 
paradigms is the use of mobile agents. 
 
A Mobile Agent (MA) is a software entity which basically exists in a software environment 
(Liotta, 2001, Pleisch and Schiper, 2004a, Richard and Lipperts, 2002). Until now, the 
research community has not agreed on a common definition for MAs. This has raised 
controversial arguments for nearly a decade and only recently have features been 
identified (Liotta, 2001) such as migration, cloning and autonomy. Various sets of required 
capacities for MAs have been devised, but none of these sets has been commonly accepted 
as a standard definition of an MA (Pleisch and Schiper, 2004). In general, the agents used 
focus on software systems and consequently, the term agent will be defined and used for 
software systems only, i.e. each agent is a software agent and thus an independent 
program. Subsequently, a MA is an agent that is able to move between different machines 
or, in a more abstract sense, between various individual network locations. An MA system 
is a software artefact, specified in a language that provides sufficient expressiveness and 
flexibility to allow the construction of multiple interacting MAs. Thorough background 
information, generally about software agents, in particular about mobile agent systems is 
presented in the succeeding chapter. 
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However, despite how fascinating the idea of mobile agent computing is, it is not without 
a glitch when it comes to the implementations and real world deployment. Mobile agents 
could be subjected to attacks launched by hostile hosts while visiting different hosts in 
the net. Sander and Tschudin raised two types of security problems that need to be solved. 
The first is host protection against malicious agents (Sander and Tschudin, 1998). The 
second is agent protection against malicious hosts. Many techniques have been developed 
for the first problem, such as access control, password protections, sand boxes etc.  
But the second problem appears to be difficult to solve. The fact is that computers have 
complete control over all the executing programs. As a consequence, it becomes very 
difficult to protect mobile agents from malicious hosts. 
 
Several studies have been done to provide a way for protecting malicious hosts on mobile 
agent networks. These solutions present many drawbacks like reducing the efficiency of 
the network, being unable to protect against denial of service. Furthermore, researchers 
are focusing their studies on detection of attacks by including an intrusion detection 
system. IDSs are hardware and software systems that monitor events occurred on 
computers and computer networks in order to analyse security problems. IDS and 
firewalls have become key components in ensuring the safety of network systems. 
Intrusions and invasions inside computer networks are called as “attacks” and these 
attacks threaten the security of networks by violating privacy, integrity and accessibility 
mechanisms. Attacks can be originated from users, who login to the computer using 
Internet, trying to gain administrator rights and other users who misuse the rights they 
have. IDSs automate monitoring and analysing the attacks. IDS can recognize the patterns 
of typical attacks, analyze the abnormal activity pattern and track the user’s policy 
violation. So it often called as the “last line of defense”. 
A new semi-supervised learning method is introduced by Chein, Wen and Lee for false 
alarm reduction using only a very small amount of labelled information. This made the 
alarm filter more practical for the real systems. Numerical comparison with the 
conventional supervised learning approach with the same small portion of the labelled 
data has been done. Analysis shows this method as having the significantly superior 
detection rate as well as in the false alarm detection rate (Chein, Wen & Lee, 2010). 
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There are four basic techniques that are used to detect intruders: Anomaly detection, 
Misuse detection (signature detection), Target monitoring and Stealth Probes. The security 
of a local networking environment, or a single computer system, is a very important aspect 
of its infrastructure. A properly secured system is able to guarantee confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of its resources and services. Thus, the ability to protect a system 
from outside interference is of most prime importance. However, flaws in computer 
systems can be specifically attacked by individuals. These attacks result in rendering the 
system vulnerable, compromising its entire security scheme. A significant aspect of the 
general security scheme is to detect if and when an attack against protected resources is 
attempted. The topic of network security that deals with this field is IDS. The Intrusion 
Detection Technology, employed in order to monitor resources distributed among several 
nodes in a local network, adopts a distributed approach to its design.  
However, this way of detection encounters many problems, like the inability to handle 
large amounts of network traffic; centralized structure of IDS can be harmed in the case of 
high speed network, increase of false alarm ratio, incapability of detection of low intensity 
attacks. Lots of work have been done in detection of intruders. But the solutions are far 
from satisfactory.  
 
In this respect, the thesis will concentrate on and provide a new detection model for: 
- Reduction of high false alarm ratio. 
- Improve the detection of low intensity attacks in mobile agents’ network. 
 
In fact, a natural idea for flooding detection is to identify changes in traffic volume or rate 
as mentioned by Chen (2006). In such schemes, alarms are raised if the traffic volume 
during a time interval is larger than a threshold, predicted according to past normal 
conditions. A major  issue of volume/rate monitoring is that the detection accuracy can be 
severely degraded if the normal rate is dynamic in the observation window, due to the 
random nature and the flooding attack rate being not very high. The use of Divergence 
Measures (Hellinger, Chi-Square and Power Divergence), which describes the deviation 
between two probability distributions, have been proposed as a detection method. These 
divergence measures schemes have shown their strong capability to detect flooding attack, 
because the low-rate flooding is likely to have different probability distributions from the 
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normal traffic. Moreover, studies (Sengar and Wijesekera, 2008) do not address how to 
maintain an accurate threshold reflecting the normal condition under attacks, which is 
critically important to the divergence measure based detection system. 
 
The work distinguishes among other works in terms of integrating the sketch technique 
with divergence measures, in order to achieve a more efficient and flexible flooding 
detection scheme. The sketch is a technique for random data aggregation, which can 
summarize the traffic associated with one or more physical attributes into a pre-
determined number of states by the hash operation. In the proposed scheme, the 
probability model is based on the sketch data, rather than directly on the physical 
attributes.   
 
In summary, the work has contributed in securing the mobile agent inside their network 
using the following four aspects: 
 
1) Apply sketch to establish a behaviour probability model, which enables our detection 
scheme to efficiently deal with flooding attacks; the sketch data structure is a probabilistic 
data summary technique. It randomly aggregates high dimensional data streams into 
smaller dimensions. 
2) Perform a high accuracy of detection of attacks while limiting the false alarm ratio as 
maximum. This is done by tuning the parameter of Divergence Measures to optimize the 
performance.  
3) Capability of the detection model to identify low intensity attacks; the experiments will 
be repeated several times on Divergence measures by changing the attack rates 
accordingly. 
4) Providing a new model for protecting mobile agents. This will be achieved by providing 
a new computing model based on trust for the protection against malicious attacks over 
mobile agents -network. A combination of two kinds of trust will be applied: policy 
enforcement and control and punishment. 
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1.2. Statement of the Problem 
Mobile agent systems need an open environment to operate and perform their job.  
More specifically, mobile agents and mobile agent platforms are subjected to attacks from 
malicious hosts and malicious mobile agents respectively. Hence, the major technical 
obstacle, to a wider acceptance of the mobile agent paradigm is security.  
There are two types of security problems that must be addressed:  
 Mobile Agent platform protection 
 Mobile Agent protection 
Many techniques have been developed for the first kind of problem but it is believed that 
the execution environment (host) has full control over executing programs; hence,   
protecting a mobile agent from malicious hosts is difficult to be achieved. 
The work emphasises on the Mobile Agent protection in relation to data collecting agents, 
which can be divided in to two parts: 
 To protect against malicious host from attacking incoming mobile agent is difficult. 
To work around this problem, the use of closed system or only trusted servers are 
needed.  
 To detect an attack against mobile agent with the capability of reducing the false 
alarm and detecting low intensity attacks. The following techniques have been 
used: sketch, divergence measure and dynamic threshold. 
Evolving from this, the research problem / thesis statement can be described as given 
below: 
How can the new proposed protection model, outperforming the existing models in terms 
of reducing the false positive ratio and capable of detecting low intensity attacks, be used 
to secure the functionality of Mobile Agents inside its network against malicious host? 
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1.3. Objectives, Methodology and Thesis Organisation 
1.3.1. Objectives  
The objectives of this thesis are to:  
 Find a new solution (for the protection and detection), different from the existing 
ones, to secure the trip of Mobile Agents inside its network. 
 Study the mobile agent systems in general and analyse the existing 
countermeasures on malicious hosts’ threats.  
 Propose a new computing model for protecting malicious attacks over mobile 
agents’ world, using trusted server which is a combination of two kinds of trust: 
policy enforcement and  control and punishment. 
 Propose a new model for detecting any threats over mobile agents. This model has 
two main objectives:  limitation of false alarm ratio and the capability of detection 
of low intensity attacks in mobile agents’ network. 
The power of this new model is the combination of several techniques: sketch 
technique, Divergence Measures (Hellinger Distance, Chi-Square and Power 
Divergence) and use of a dynamic threshold to differentiate network anomalies 
from normal behaviour on the mobile agent.  
1.3.2. Methodology  
Different methodologies are used for the various phases of the thesis work.  
The first phase involves the study of the issues and areas closely related to the thesis work, 
in order to get a deeper understanding of the problem. This is accomplished mainly 
through a literature review, viz. reading journal papers, articles, books and supplementary 
reading materials. 
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Major activities performed in this phase are: 
 Studying about software agents in general, their characteristics and mobile agent 
systems. 
 Studying the various types of distributed computing paradigms which include 
client server, remote evaluation, code on demand and mobile computing. 
 Studying threats posed on mobile computation, specifically on mobile agents. 
Various propositions available far are studied and analysed as well, which helped 
us to come up with our own perception of the problem. 
Overall, the major tasks performed during this phase were focused on gaining all the 
necessary background information that is needed to understand the broader picture of the 
problem as well as its surroundings. 
The last phase of the work deals with the development and realization of models that will 
address some of the threats posed to mobile agents. The major activities carried out 
include: 
 Development of models (detection and protection) to mitigate some of the 
problems posed on mobile agents, specifically to that of data collecting agents. 
 Evaluation and selection of different mobile agent platforms that would be used 
to realize the concept. 
 Further refining the concept developed. 
 Collection of data by implementing a mobile agent network. 
 Validation and Evaluation of the work:  
1- Tuning the parameter of Divergence Measures to optimize the performance. A 
comparison between different divergence measures will be done to choose the 
best detection with low false alarm ratio. A dynamic threshold will be used to 
differentiate network anomalies from normal behaviour on the mobile agent.  
2- Conducting performance analysis over real IP traces publicly available, in 
Mobile Agent Network, integrated with flooding attacks.   
3- Testing the detection of low intensity attacks over different divergence 
measures with different flooding rate. 
CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION     
 
9 
 
4- Evaluating the performance of the proposed divergence measures via the False 
positive alarm, false negative alarm, receiver operating characteristic (ROC), 
and confusion matrix. 
The diagram given below presents the approach to solve the security issue of mobile 
agents. 
Development of models (detection and 
prevention) 
Evaluation and selection of different 
mobile agent  platforms 
Refining the concept developed
Collection of  data by implementing a 
mobile agent network
Validat ion and Evaluat ion of the work
Which new protection model can be 
proposed to secure the funct ionality of 
Mobile  Agents  
 
Figure 1-1 Approach to solve the problem of MA 
1.3.3. Thesis Organisation  
The main chapters in this thesis are organised as follows: 
 Chapter 2 gives an overview of Mobile Agent systems (MAs) and also has addressed 
the main features of the MAs such as mobility, portability, communication, etc. It also 
shows that the MAs offer several advantages for distribution management over the 
traditional solutions, for instance; communication latency and bandwidth, off-line 
processing, reaction time, asynchronous behaviour by request aggregation and 
software-distribution on demand, which put MAs in better position to replace or to 
coexist with the traditional technology in network management to cope with the up-
to-date users needs. 
 Chapter 3 discusses the background and related work in the context of computer 
networking and system management and has addressed the main issues in the area of 
such threats over mobile agents.  
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 Chapter 4 explains the proposed model for detecting attacks over mobile agent 
network. It will combine sketch technique and divergence measure (Hellinger 
Distance, Chi square and Power Divergence) in order to find the best way for the 
detection.  
 Chapter 5 presents a new computing model for protection of malicious mobile agent 
in a mobile agent world. It will show the components of the proposed countermeasure 
model. indeed, it will propose a security model that defines how components of the 
system should interact with each other as well as what necessary tasks need to be 
performed at each level in order to secure the network from malicious attack. 
 Chapter 6 shows tests and verifies the strength and performance of the proposed new 
approaches for the detection and protection of attacks over mobile agent network.   
 Chapter 7 concludes the work in this thesis and offers suggestions for future work are 
outlined as well. 
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 Chapter 2 : Mobile Agent 
Overview 
 
2.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the concepts of protection of mobile agents have been discussed. 
It has been shown that the CS paradigm is the most popular paradigm for current 
networks; however, with the rising demands on processing power and the need to 
conserve bandwidth on large and slow networks, the limitations of this approach are 
easily perceptible. The concept of distributed CS computing can be too restrictive for 
certain applications (Pleisch and Schiper, 2004a). For instance, the functionality of a server 
is defined by its computing interface and generally cannot be adapted to the client's needs 
without reconfiguring that interface. Undoubtedly, this limits the flexibility with which a 
client can use a server and forces the client to process the server data locally according to 
the client's requests. Consequently, the mobile code-computing paradigm was introduced. 
With this paradigm, not only, data but also the code to act on the data, are transmitted 
between the client and the server. Transmitting the code makes the applications more 
flexible and actively allows the client to modify the functionality provided by the server 
to its fundamental needs. When using Mobile Agents (MAs), it is possible to bring the 
code close to the resources, which is not possible with the CS paradigm.  
 
This chapter starts with a short overview of Mobile Agents. A definition of a Mobile Agent 
is given in Section 3.2. An introduction of a MA platform, which it is adopted in this 
research, has been given in Section 3.3. Malicious Hosts on Mobile Agents and their 
Countermeasures are discussed in Section 3.4.  
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2.2. Mobile Agents 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, an agent is “one who (or that which) acts or 
exerts power, as distinguished from the patient, and also from the instrument. For 
example, James Bond (007) is a fictional British agent created by the novelist Ian Fleming 
in 1952 (Siemens, 2002).  Therefore, an agent is a person or an object that has the power to 
thoroughly act on others' behalf with official authority. In the case of Mobile Agents, there 
are several definitions by different authors.  A Mobile Agent is defined as an agent capable 
of moving between machines (Pham and Karmouch, 1998). It was also described as an 
agent that has the unique ability of transporting itself from one network to the other 
(Lange and Oshima, 2003). In a nutshell, a Mobile Agent is a form of software agent, capable of 
travelling across a network. For a comprehensive overview about MAs, the reader can be 
referred  to (Graesser,2006). 
 
To be precise, Mobile Agents are Software agents that automate tasks. What distinguishes 
software agents from other utility software programs are both the ability to perform in 
distributed computing environments and to supply some domain knowledge to 
automating tasks for users’ (Watson, 1997). 
 
Furthermore, the state of a mobile agent consists of the attributes and values of the mobile 
agent that assist in the executions of its functions and the code is, for example, the Java 
classes or compiled/uncompiled C code.  
 
The mobile agent needs to maintain the same state and code, while travelling down a 
network, for unique identification and for execution of its functions at any point on the 
network. It is only capable of executing its functions or interacting with an object across a 
network with the same host. 
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2.2.1. Network Paradigm 
Mobile agent computing is just one of the four network computing paradigms, used to 
develop distributed applications. Each one paradigm has its own mechanism of 
performing the computation as well as area of applicability. These paradigms are: 
 Client-Server 
 Remote Evaluation 
 Mobile Agent 
 
Client – Server 
This paradigm is the first one for implementing distributed applications, using remote 
procedure call approach. It utilizes centralized servers and distributed clients. The servers 
publish methods to be used by clients to access data and services it offers. Whenever the 
client wants to get some kind of service from the server, it calls the right published 
interface with appropriate arguments. 
 
The server after processing the call returns the result to the client. Figure 2-1 shows a 
typical client-server environment, e.g. HTTP and FTP. 
 
Client
Server
S
E
R
V
I
C
E
s
CODE
1- Execute
2- Continue
2- Call Procedure
3- Return Result
 
Figure 2-1:  Client-server computing model 
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Remote Evaluation 
Unlike the client-server paradigm, this paradigm not only transfers data between the client 
and the server, but also the code. Once this code is transferred to the server, it will be 
executed there and only the result will be returned to the client. In contrast to the client – 
server paradigm, only one connection to the server has to be made to transfer the code to 
the server instead of several, as in client – server.  
 
Figure 2-2 shows the typical remote evaluation environment, e.g. rsh command in Unix. 
 
Client
Server
S
E
R
V
I
C
E
s
CODE
1- Execute
5- Continue
2- Transfer Code
4- Return Result
CODE
 
Figure 2-2:  Remote Evaluation 
Mobile Agent 
In this paradigm, the code (agent) moves from place to place to perform computation on 
behalf of its possessor. It is somewhat similar to remote evaluation, except that the code 
has autonomy and could visit multiple nodes before returning to its home.  
Figure 2-3, given below shows typical mobile agent computing environment. 
An MA could migrate between nodes, carrying the necessary code to be executed 
(Nikaein, 1999). MAs offer a real benefit to the system developers and the users of the 
applications based on MA, specifying which parameters can be improved upon. The 
importance of the key parameters such as performance, connectivity, reliability and 
modularity varies from one application to another.  
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Results
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Figure 2-3 :Mobile Agent Computing Model 
2.2.2. Mobile Agent Migration 
Mobile agents perform their functions by travelling from one node to another. Their 
autonomous characteristic allows them to travel to any node at any time. Alternatively, 
pre-coded itineraries allow them to travel to the specific nodes. MAs have little or no 
external influence and always travel with their state of execution. 
 
The following requirements that make it possible for mobile agent migration across a 
network are mentioned in (Reilly, 1998): 
 Common Execution Language: The problem of having a common execution language 
persists due to the fact that the migrated agent can only perform its function if the 
host at the source and the destination have a common executable language. This 
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requirement best suits heterogeneous network instances, as the network may be 
composed of different network architectures. 
 Process Persistence: Process persistence as a property of the platform (Aglet, see 
Section 2.3) is normally designed in the mobile agent architecture. This helps 
maintain its execution state during travel across the network, by changing it to a 
transferable form of data that could be sent in a particular state before its execution 
at the destination. 
 Communication Mechanism Between an Agent’s Hosts - Using techniques like   shared 
code systems or caching is very effective in agent transfer, as it uses a minimal 
bandwidth. It is also suitable, as the transfer of an agent executable code or its 
persistent state requires the use of large network bandwidth.     
 
The migration process can involve different considerations of how to get the best use of 
this feature. This process with all its issues, especially in the area of interest, will be 
discussed in the next chapter.  
2.2.3. Mobile Agent Life Cycle  
A Mobile Agent contains only code and status. It can only be created in a local server and 
each agent has a unique identifier. Both the serialisation and deserialisation of the mobile 
agent are possible, allowing for the suspension of its execution and resumption later on in 
the same or different host.  The communication layer is responsible for agent remote 
messaging and transportation. It does so by using an application-level protocol called the 
Agent Transfer Protocol (ATP) which is also an internet protocol (Lange and Oshima, 
1998). 
 
The life cycle of the MA is depicted in Figure 2-4. After the MA has been created in the 
home node and its state configured, the MA starts performing its duties.  A home node 
(HN) is the where the MA is being created. 
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During its life, the agent can travel and visit different hosts. After finishing its tasks, it can 
suspend, clone or terminate itself. Usually, the agent comes back to the home host to give 
the collected results before terminating itself. 
 
A home node is the where the MA is being created. 
executing
suspended
migrating
Returning home
Mobile Agent creation 
and configuration
terminated
 
Figure 2-4: Mobile Agent Life Cycle. 
2.2.4. Examples of Mobile Agents 
Many Mobile Agent platforms have been developed during the last decade. The platforms 
have been programmed using different programming languages such as Java, TCl, C/C++ 
and other miscellaneous codes. Some of these platforms have been developed for 
commercial purposes and others for research.  
 
In this section, seven of the popular platforms are presented and compared according to 
(Gupta & Kansal, 2011). The platforms are as follows: Aglet, Voyager, Grasshopper, 
Tryllian, JADE, Tracy and SPRINGS. The work of Altmann, Gruber,Klug & Weipll  shows 
that the Aglet, Voyager and Grasshopper platforms are the best Mobile Agent platforms 
(Altmann, Gruber,Klug & Weipll, 2001).  
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Below is a comparison between the seven popular platforms based on (Gupta & Kansal, 
2011), (Trillo, Ilarri & Mena, 2007) and (Silva, Soares, Martins, & Santos, 2000). 
 
 Voyager1  developed initially by ObjectSpace in 1997 and currently by Recursion 
Software (last version: Voyager Edge 6.0.1, August 2006), is a distributed 
computing middleware, focused towards simplifying the management of remote 
communications of traditional CORBA and RMI protocols. The main drawback of 
Voyager is that it is a commercial product not available for free, which 
could/might protect many researchers from using it in favour of other alternatives 
available. 
 
 Grasshopper2 was developed by IKV++ in 1999 (last version: 2.2.4, January 2003), 
then became part of the commercial Enago Mobile and today its development has 
probably been abandoned. The main disadvantage of Grasshopper is that it is not 
available anymore and new versions will not appear in the future in all probability. 
The region server could become a bottleneck, as it must update every proxy right 
before using it. 
 
 Tryllian3 developed by the Homonym company in 2001 (last version: 3.2.0, 
released as open source in November 2005), is based on a sensing-reasoning action 
mechanism. It allows programmers to define a reactive (based on incoming 
messages) and proactive (based on heartbeats) behavior of agents.  The main 
disadvantage of Tryllian is that it does not offer location transparency (the current 
location of the target agent of a message must be known in advance). Furthermore, 
its taskbased and asynchronous model could be difficult to use, due to its 
differences with the classical procedural programming. 
 
                                                     
1 http://www.recursionsw.com/,2006 
2 www.ikv.de/products/grasshoper  
3 http://www.tryllian.org,2005 
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 JADE4 developed by Telecom Italia Lab since July 1998, was released as open 
source in February 2000 (last version: JADE 3.4.1, November 2006). It is a very 
popular FIPA-compliant agent platform. An agent is composed of different 
concurrent (and non-preemptive) behaviors, which can be added dynamically.  
Probably, the main disadvantage is that mobility is not a key element in JADE. 
Thus, it focuses on other functionalities relevant to the development of multi-agent 
systems. 
 
 Tracy5 developed at the University of Jena in Germany (last version: 1.0.1-52, April 
2005), has a plugin-oriented architecture. Plugins are software components that 
can be added dynamically to a running agency (the context where agents execute), 
if required, in order to provide high-level services (e.g., inter-agent 
communication, migration, security, etc.).  A key disadvantage of Tracy is that it 
does not support remote communications between agents: an agent must travel to 
the agency where another agent is running in order to communicate with it. The 
platform was probably developed mainly as a test environment, where different 
migration and class loading strategies could be evaluated, and in that aspect the 
authors have performed a meritorious and interesting research work. 
 
 SPRINGS6 developed recently by the Distributed Information Systems Group at 
the University of Zaragoza in Spain , focuses on scalability and reliability in 
scenarios, with a moderate and high number of mobile agents. Its development 
has been inspired by the features of other popular platforms, such as Voyager and 
Grasshopper. The main disadvantage of SPRINGS is perhaps that it does not 
support agent communication, using the standard FIPA. In addition, it does not 
provide sophisticated security mechanisms. Despite the fact that it is easy to use, 
it does not offer any graphical tool to the user. Unfortunately as it is a new 
platform, there is little documentation available about it. 
                                                     
4 http://jade.tilab.com/,2006 
5 http://www.mobile-agents.org,2005 
6 http://sid.cps.unizar.es/SPRINGS/,2006 
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 Aglets7 initially developed by IBM and maintained by the open source community 
since 2001 (last version: 2.02, June 2004), is probably the most popular mobile agent 
platform developed so far.  Aglets is built around a single-thread model for agents 
and a communication infrastructure based on message passing. Both synchronous 
and asynchronous messages are supported. Agents in Aglets use proxies as a 
convenient abstraction to refer to remote agents (e.g., to send them messages).  
 
One of its strongest points is that it follows the MASIF specification. Aglets is built 
around a single-thread model for agents,  and a communication infrastructure based 
on message passing. Aglets has contributed significantly to the field of mobile agents 
in terms of classes, and objects.  Aglet is an open source. Moreover, it does offer any 
graphical tool to the user. It can be with BOUNCY Castle (a security mechanism).  
 
From the mentioned positive points of Aglets, the Aglet platform, for this research, has 
been selected.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
7 http://aglets.sourceforge.net,2004 
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2.2.5. Adopting the Mobile Agent 
Mobile agents have been accepted, tested and proven to be the generally effective way of 
managing networks facilitating flexibility, automation and security. The following 
situations that made mobile agents more suitable are: 
 Multi-processor Calculations: Breaking calculations down into discrete units is the 
only way large calculations are done by processors on a large network. The 
discrete units are simultaneously processed by a pool of processors or servers. The 
function of the Mobile Agent here is to transport the discrete units to the new hosts, 
initiate calculations and return, with the results for possible aggregation. 
 Low-reliability or Partially Disconnected Networks: Low reliability network 
connections to devices, such as laptops, make it difficult to download large 
volumes of data. The mobile agent given specific instructions, is capable of 
travelling to the source of the data and calculate, or filter out, all unnecessary data 
and bring the desired data back. The source of the agent does not need to be online 
for this execution. 
 Communication: An agent is always capable of communicating with both the 
master agent of the host and other agents. Collaborating through communication 
with these agents helps agents to reach their goals. 
 Learning: Mobile agents have the ability to learn. They learn from their 
environments while executing their functions. Learning can be done deliberately 
by storing large volumes of data for knowledge or by reflexive learning, where the 
mobile agents learn gradually from their environments as they progress. There are 
also traces of achievements of semi-intelligence when agents collaborate among 
each other. 
 Robustness: A mobile agent must be robust enough to be able to withstand 
unfavourable or unexpected conditions which might cause breakdowns, damages 
or entire destruction itelf. 
 An activity called the Checkpoint Restore mechanism is always used to restart 
agents and check state information before and after execution on any server. Any 
agents left on the server at the time of shutdown are capable of being restarted 
with the execution of a recovery process when that server is restarted.   
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According to Pleisch and Schiper (2004a), all the problems that were considered as 
examples for the use of MAs could also be solved by using the traditional CS paradigm. 
Nevertheless, MAs allow a general solution to all problems that need to be distributed. 
Instead of having to create different solutions to every problem, MAs can present a 
standard solution to all problems. In fact, agents are already used in new software 
products such as Microsoft Outlook Express, Microsoft Office and other software like 
operating systems. Outlook Express has been developed as an email and news client 
bundle. It has some definitions of an agent, as previously described, by attempting to 
observe user actions and to offer help based on these actions. Also, the user can customise 
these agents to do specific jobs, such as filtering the incoming emails and blocking junk 
emails.  The use of MAs offers several advantages over traditional solutions, for instance: 
communication latency and bandwidth, off-line processing, reaction time, asynchronous 
behaviour by request aggregation, software-distribution on demand, scalability due to 
dynamic deployment, heterogeneity fault tolerance, etc. These advantages make MAs an 
appropriate and helpful technology for various application domains. 
2.3. Agent Platform Overview with Aglet  
In this work, the Aglet platform has been used in order to design the proposed model and 
to test the real behaviour of the Mobile Agent in the network area. In this section, an 
overview about the platform will be provided. 
 
 In early 1995, the research laboratory of IBM Tokyo developed the Aglet API as an agent 
development kit. Danny B. Lange, a member of the research team, initiated this effort as 
cited by Lange and Oshima (2003). An Aglet can simply be defined as Java mobile agents. 
In other words, it is a Java object capable of transporting itself from one host to another on 
a network while maintaining their code and data. The earlier version of Aglet developed 
was Version 1.0.3 which later, through the open source project, became available as the 
later versions (Aglet 2.0.2). It is also mentioned in Lange and Oshima, (2003) that someone 
can think of an Aglet being a generalized and extended version of a Java applet and 
servlet. It also acknowledges the concept of having its itinerary dynamically generated 
and executed autonomously.  
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Aglet executes in an Aglet server host. The default Aglet server host is called Tahiti. Figure 
2-5 shows the Graphic User Interface (GUI) of the Tahiti server running on default port 
number of 4434. 
 
Figure 2-5: Tahiti Graphic User Interface (GUI) 
2.3.1. Aglet System Architecture 
The Aglets architecture consists of two layers (runtime layer and the communication layer) 
and two Application Program Interfaces (APIs) that define interfaces for accessing their 
functions. Figure 2-6 shows the Aglet architecture with the two layers and the API. 
Aglet API
Aglets Runtime Layer
Core Framework
Communication API
Communication Layer
 
Figure 2-6: Aglet Architecture 
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The Aglets runtime layer implements Aglets interfaces such as AgletContext and 
AgletProxy. It consists of a core model and subcomponents as well. The core model 
provides the fundamental mechanisms to Aglet execution, i.e. serialization and 
deserialization of Aglets, class loading and transfer, and reference management and 
garbage collection. 
The Aglets runtime itself has no communication mechanism for transferring the  serialized 
data of an Aglet to destinations. Instead, the Aglets runtime uses the communication API 
that abstracts the communication between agent systems. This API defines methods for 
creating and transferring agents, tracking agents, and managing agents in an agent-system 
in an independent way. 
The current Aglets uses the Agent Transfer Protocol (ATP) as the default implementation 
of the communication layer. 
2.3.2. Aglet Model 
A closer look at the model underlying the Aglets API is taken care of in this subsection. 
The key abstractions are aglet, proxy, context and message. Definitions are as follows: 
- Aglet: An aglet is a mobile java object that visits aglet enabled hosts in a computer 
network. 
- Proxy: A proxy is a representative of aglet. It serves as a shield for the aglet to 
protect the aglet from direct access to its public methods. The proxy also provides 
location transparency for the aglet. 
- Context: A context is aglet’s workplace. It is a stationary object that provides a 
means for maintaining and managing the running aglet in a uniform execution 
environment, where the host system is secured against the malicious aglet. One 
node in a computer network may run multiple servers and each server may host 
multiple contexts. Contexts are named and can be located by the combination of 
their server address and their name. 
- Message: A message is an object exchanged between aglets. It allows for 
synchronous as well as asynchronous messages passing between aglets. Message 
passing can be used by aglets to collaborate and exchange information in a loosely 
coupled fashion.  
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2.3.3. A tour of the Aglet API 
The aglet API is used by programmers to create and operate aglets. It contains methods 
for initializing an aglet, message handling, dispatching, retracting, deactivating, 
activating, cloning and disposing of the aglet. The aglet API is a Java package (aglet) 
consisting of classes and interfaces, most notably, Aglet, AgletProxy, AgletContext and 
Message. 
 
- Aglet Class:  The Aglet class is the key class in the Aglet API. This is the abstract 
class that the aglet developer uses as a base class, when he or she creates 
customized aglets. The Aglet class defines methods for controlling its own life 
cycle, viz. methods for cloning, dispatching, deactivating and disposing of itself. It 
also defines methods that are supposed to be overridden in its subclasses by the 
aglet programmer and provides the necessary "hooks" to customize the behaviour 
of the aglet. These methods are systematically invoked by the system when certain 
events take place in the life cycle of an aglet. 
 
- AgletProxy Interface: The AgletProxy Interface acts as a handle of an aglet and 
provides a common way of accessing the aglet behind it. Since an aglet class has 
several public methods that should not be accessed directly from other aglets for 
security reasons, any aglet that wants to communicate with other aglets has to first 
obtain the proxy and then interact through this interface. In other words, the aglet 
proxy acts as a shield object that protects an aglet from malicious aglets. Another 
important role of the AgletProxy interface is to provide the aglet with location 
transparency. If the actual aglet resides at a remote host, the proxy forwards the 
requests to that remote host and returns the result to the local host. 
 
- AgletContext Interface: An aglet spends most of its life in an aglet context. It is 
created in the context, it goes to sleep there, and it dies there. When it travels in a 
network, it really moves from context to context. In other words, the context is a 
uniform execution environment for aglets in an otherwise heterogeneous world. 
The AgletContext interface is used by an aglet to get information about its 
environment and to send messages to the environment, including other aglets, 
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currently active in that environment. It provides means for maintaining and 
managing running aglets in an environment where the host system is secured 
against malicious aglets. 
 
- Message Class:  Aglets communicate by exchanging objects of the Message class. 
A string field named "kind" distinguishes messages. This field is set when the 
message is created. The second parameter of the message constructor is an optional 
message argument.  
2.3.4. Security 
As pointed out in the proposed solution, the prototype development exploits 
cryptographic concepts to some extent. Hence cryptographic algorithms need to be 
incorporated in the developed program. Fortunately, Java is currently perceived as the 
most secure object-oriented programming language. Security in Java was enhanced by 
reviewing other object-oriented programming languages like C and C++. Additionally, it 
has a support for a seamless integration of a third party implementation of cryptographic 
services providers (just providers) through its Java Cryptographic Architecture (JCA)8. 
Various providers exist for the Java platform. Some are free for academic purposes while 
others are extremely expensive. In the developed prototype, a cryptography provider 
called Bouncy Castle9 is used. 
The Bouncy Castle, also called BC provider, offers a pure Java implementation of different 
cryptographic algorithms. A range of other crypto- based products can also be found on 
the site. It is a free cryptographic package, where its running and maintenance are carried 
out by volunteers. It has a support for a wide range of various cryptographic algorithms 
at various levels of strength. True to its reputations, its jar file is signed by Sun, so that it 
can be easily integrated into the platform. This provider is integrated into the Java 
platform and its various crypto packages are extensively used to provide cryptographic 
services for the various parts of the agent system. 
                                                     
8 https://docs.oracle.com/javase/8/docs/technotes/guides/security/crypto/CryptoSpec.html, 2002 
9 http://www.bouncycastle.org, 2016 
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2.4. Malicious Hosts on Mobile Agents and their 
Countermeasures 
The previous chapter has provided a detailed view of the makeup of mobile agent 
systems. Security is one of the key factors of MAS. In fact, a MA is one of the potential 
threats to computer systems and vice versa, ie. , from the host system to the MAS itself. In 
this part of the dissertation, the main security issues related to MAS will be described in 
details. 
2.4.1. Malicious Hosts 
The four main forms of attacks by malicious hosts on mobile agents are: 
- IP spoofing: consists of sending packets with a faked IP source address. The server 
should believe that the packets come from another host, probably a host that is 
allowed to establish connections with the attacked host, if the real one is not 
allowed. 
- Sniffing: it is the observation and analysis of network traffic in order to obtain 
relevant information (such as IP addresses and host functionalities) to perform 
other attacks. 
- Denial of Services: A host may deny an agent a specific service provided by the 
host. It is possible for a host to both intentionally and unintentionally deny an 
agent a service. A host may deny an agent service so that the agent is not able to 
complete its task. Another possible attack is where the host could terminate the 
agent altogether. Furthermore, a host may deny a request from an agent on a 
time-sensitive task, so that the agent is unable to complete its task in its allotted 
time. 
 
-  UDP flood attack: this kind of flooding attack consists on sending many UDP 
packets to a different port of a target in a random fashion. This target will check if 
there is any application on the relevant port; if not, he will be occupied to send 
ICMP replies and cannot treat requests from legitimate clients. 
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- SYN flood attack: it consists of sending many TCP connection requests to a target. 
The latter will accept the establishment of the connection and notify the client. 
Except for this, this one will never use them. Thereby, the server will be drown by 
unused connections and, eventually, will not reply to legitimate users requests. 
 
- Eavesdropping: The classical eavesdropping threat involves the interception and 
monitoring of secret communications. The threat of eavesdropping, however, is 
further exacerbated in mobile agent systems because the agent platform can not 
only monitor communications, but also can monitor every instruction executed by 
the agent, all the data it brings to the platform, and all the subsequent data 
generated on the platform. Since the platform has access to the agent’s code, state, 
and data, the visiting agent must be wary of the fact that it may be exposing 
proprietary algorithms, trade secrets, negotiation strategies, or other sensitive 
information. Even though the agent may not be directly exposing secret 
information, the platform may be able to infer meaning. 
 
- Alteration: The final form of attack by a host on an agent is the alteration of the 
agent. The host can alter an agent by changing the data, code and control flow. A 
malicious host may try to change the code of an agent so that the agent performs 
other tasks than were intended by its creator. A host may also try to change the 
data contained in the agent. 
2.4.2. Countermeasures for Security Services   
There are many security services that can be used for securing the agents systems, for 
example, authentication, integrity, confidentiality and authorization. 
In case of the authentication, the host needs to know the sender of the delivered agent. 
The agent authentication process includes verifying the entity that programmed the agent 
and also verifying the entity that dispatched it to the host. Basically, the agent and the host 
need to know whom they are talking to and dealing with; here the public-key encryption 
or passwords can be used. 
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Regarding integrity, checking the integrity of the agents is a technique that makes sure no 
one has made any changes to the agents, the agents travelling from on  host to another, 
and communicates and exchanges their data with other hosts and other agents. In this 
case, it is required to make sure that the agents have not been tampered with in relation to 
their state, code or data. Moreover, the agents could carry different types of data, for 
example some private data. These data should only be readable from a specific host or 
agents. This technique is very important to avoid an eavesdropping threat.  
The last service which helps to protect the agents and the hosts is authorization; the 
incoming agents should have a specific right to access the host information, so different 
agents have different authority, to protect the hosts and also to protect themselves. 
 
2.5. Summary  
This chapter has given an overview of Mobile Agent systems and has addressed the main 
features of Mobile Agents such as mobility, portability, communication, etc. It has also 
shown that the MAs offer several advantages over traditional solutions of network 
management, for instance, communication latency and bandwidth, off-line processing, 
reaction time, asynchronous behaviour by request aggregation on demand which give 
MAs a substantial advantage over traditional technology, in detection and protection 
against malicious hosts in  the mobile agent world. 
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 Chapter 3 : Literature Review 
 
3.1. Introduction  
For wide scale applications, the approaches to protect an agent can be broadly classified 
as two main mechanisms: 
 Detection Technique attempt to detect unauthorized modification of code, state or 
execution of mobile agent. 
 protection technique attempt to try to make it impossible to access or modify code, 
state or data of mobile agent.  
The purpose of this chapter is to give an overview of existing detection and protection 
mechanisms on mobile agents and their drawbacks. Consequently, this will explain the 
reasons that motivate and push us to provide this work.  
3.2. Existing protection Techniques and their Drawbacks 
Several ways of existing protection techniques are used in order to protect the mobile 
agents from malicious hosts. 
3.2.1. Distributed Technique for Multi-Agents 
E.Abolfazl and M.R.Ali have proposed a novel distributed protocol for multi agent 
environments to improve the communication security in packet-switched networks. This 
approach makes use of distribution, double encryption and some other traditional 
methods such as digital signature (Abolfazl and Ali, 2009). In this approach, the encrypted 
message and encrypted private key are broken into different parts carried by different 
agents, which makes it difficult for malicious entities to extract the private key for message 
encryption, while the private key for the encrypted key is allocated on the predetermined 
destination nodes. Every part is assembled and decrypted by different mobile agents 
along different routes to the destination.  
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The main advantages are that double encryption used in this approach prepares an 
appropriate infrastructure for today’s critical areas such as e-commerce or NCW.  
The main drawback of this technique is that the computation load of the approach is 
larger. 
3.2.2. Environmental Key Generation Technique 
Environmental Key Generation describes a scheme for allowing an agent to take 
predefined action when some environmental condition is true. The approach centers on 
constructing agents in such a way that upon encountering an environmental condition (for 
example, string match in search) a key is generated which is used to unlock some 
executable code cryptographically. The environmental condition is hidden through either 
a one-way hash or public key encryption of the environmental trigger. The technique 
ensures that a platform or an observer of the agent cannot uncover the triggering message 
or response action by directly reading the agent’s code. The procedure is somewhat 
leading to the way in which passwords are maintained in modern operating systems and 
used to determine whether login attempts are valid.  
 
One weakness of this approach is that a platform that completely controls the agent could 
simply modify the agent to print out the executable code upon receipt of the trigger, 
instead of literally executing it. Another drawback is that an agent platform typically limits 
the capability of an agent, to execute code created dynamically, since it is considered an 
unsafe operation. An author of an agent can apply the technique in conjunction with other 
protection mechanisms for specific applications on appropriate platforms. 
3.2.3. Secure Software technique for MA Execution 
Mousa and Ljiljana have proposed a software solution for secure execution of mobile 
agents under untrusted execution environment (Mousa and Ljiljana, 2005). As per their 
proposal, the agent home made its code hidden from the remote host on which it executes 
to maintain privacy. Home platform has an algorithm in form of function f. At remote 
sites, the target host has data (input) x and it computes f(x) to provide services to agent. 
To secure the function f so that remote host cannot read this, home platform encrypts the 
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function f to get E (f) and then embodies encrypted function within program. Home 
platform inserts this program within agent code and sends it to the remote host platform 
for execution. The target platform runs program on input x and produces E (f(x)), then the 
generated output (final results) is sent back to its home platform. Home platform decrypts 
it and gets f(x). The main advantage is that this mechanism enables the agent to execute in 
secure manner at remote untrusted platforms.  
The main drawback is that it is not capable of protecting the system from denial of service 
attack and replay attack. 
3.2.4. DDOS Protection Technique 
Timcenko proposes a protection mechanism for distributed denial of service (DDoS) 
attacks in Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANET) environment (Timcenko, 2014). This 
approach relies on the investigation of widespread bandwidth attacks, with focus on 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, which are extremely dangerous, are hard to 
detect and challenging to be protected. DDoS represents a coordinated activity of a group 
of attackers aiming to protect legitimate users the access to network resources.  The paper 
analyses the new proposed mechanism (Flexible MANET Prevention Algorithm (FMPA)) 
under two cases: 5 % and 10 % intruders and was successfully able to detect three 
consecutive attacks, generated by a synchronous activity of a group of nodes. 
The power of DDoS attacks is intensified with use of multiple attack sources, thus 
providing favourable conditions for jeopardizing network security. The factor of attack 
duration and repetition can additionally reinforce the attack effect, weaken network 
performances and protect legal users the access to network services. 
The main drawback is the extra cost in memory and computation time necessary to 
execute the technique. 
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3.2.5. Multi-Facet Security Approach 
The multi-facet security approach is proposed by (Ngreki and Kahonge, 2015) in order to 
protect against malicious host. This security strategy is purposely to contain most of the 
threats dogging multi-agent systems, especially for the malicious hosts attack. In their 
work, Time-To-Live TTL and heartbeat methods were adopted as technique to tackle the 
DoS attack, encryption method provided confidentiality and integrity of agents’ code.  
The strength of the work is tested by proposing an environment of 6 hosts where the job 
of some of them is to corrupt other multi-agent systems’ states and data by injecting 
random data and setting the agents’ states to random values. Hosts are simulated by 
having them listen on different ports. Results have shown that traffic data is encrypted 
and thus cannot be easily interpreted. 
However, the mechanism failed to offer protection against the repudiation attack. 
3.2.6. Obfuscation technique 
Another technique for protection is Obfuscation; it is a technique in which the mobile code 
producer enforces the security policy by applying a behaviour preserving transformation 
to the code before it sends it to run on different platforms that are trusted to various 
degrees. Obfuscation aims to protect the code from being analysed and understood by the 
host. Consequently, the host should/ would not be able to modify the mobile code’s 
behaviour or expose sensitive information that is hidden inside the code such as a secret 
key, credit card number, etc. Typically, the transformation procedure that is used to 
generate the obfuscated code aims to make the same very hard to understand or be 
analysed by malicious parties. There are different, useful obfuscating transformations. 
Layout obfuscation tries to remove or modify some information in the code, such as 
comments and debugging information, without affecting the executable part of the code. 
Data obfuscation concentrates on obfuscating the data and data structures in the code 
without modifying the code itself.  
Hohl suggests using the obfuscation technique to obtain a time limited black box agent 
that can be executed safely on a malicious platform for a certain period of time but not 
forever (Hohl, 1998).  The central idea is not to allow an attacker to build such a mental 
model of the agent in advance (before the agent arrives, and to make the process of 
building this model a time-consuming task). The first goal is reached by creating a new 
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“form” of the agent dynamically, in an unpredictable, manner at the start of the protection 
interval. The second goal is reached by using conversion algorithms that produce a new 
form that is hard to analyse. In this context hard means that the analysis should take as 
much as time as possible. These conversion algorithms are therefore called obfuscating or 
mess-up algorithms. 
D’Anna points out that obfuscation could delay but not protect the attacks on agent via 
reverse engineering (Larry D’Anna, 2003). They also argue that an attacker with enough 
computational resources, such as enough time, can always de-obfuscate the code. Barak 
et al studied the theoretical limits of obfuscation techniques and showed that in general 
achieving completely secure obfuscation is impossible. In addition to protecting a mobile 
agent, obfuscation can also be used for other applications such as protecting digital 
watermarking, enforcement of software licensing and protecting protocols from spoofing. 
As far as the performance is concerned, some obfuscation techniques reduce the size of 
the code and thus speed up its execution, while others achieve the opposite (control 
obfuscation). Obfuscation is considered resistant to impersonation and denial of service 
attacks. This technique is flexible and inexpensive. Depending on the need for security, an 
application can be obfuscated accordingly. In this technique, there is a possibility to create 
different instances of one software application to battle global attacks. It has low 
maintenance cost, due to automation of the transformation process and compatibility with 
systems.  This technique is platform independent.  
This technique has a number of drawbacks: for instance, every transformation introduces 
extra cost in memory and computation time necessary to execute the obfuscate program. 
Obfuscation does not provide waterproof security. Most of these code transformations are 
not one- way and it is hard to decide where to use which transformations. 
Sandya defined obfuscation as an approach where an agent owner (home agent platform) 
enforces a security policy by applying a behavior preserving transformation to the code 
before it is dispatched to run on unknown and known hosts. The code obfuscation creates 
a blackbox entity where agent’s program is illegible and hides data thereby rendering it 
difficult for attackers (malicious hosts) to read and modify the agent’s code, its data and 
partial results (Sandya, 2015).  
However, this approach offers short-lived code obfuscation as given time, the malicious 
platform will be able to de-obfuscate the code. 
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3.3. Existing Detection Techniques and their Drawbacks 
Several ways of existing Detection Techniques are used to detect unauthorized 
modifications of code, state or execution of mobile agent.  
3.3.1. Watermarking and Fingerprinting Detection Techniques 
Oscar, Marcel and Miguel have proposed two traceability techniques, viz., watermarking 
and fingerprinting (Oscar, Marcel and Miguel, 2003). In these techniques, a mark is 
embedded into the agent and the agent’s execution creates marked results. When an agent 
returns to its original host, these results are examined. If the mark has changed or has 
disappeared, this means that the executing host has modified the agent. In the agent’s 
watermarking scheme, the mark is embedded into mobile agent’s code, because all 
executing hosts in the agent’s itinerary must run the same marked code. But in agent’s 
fingerprinting scheme, the embedded mark is different for each host because mark is 
embedded into agent’s data and data is usually different for each host.  
However, the main drawback of these techniques are:  increase in its code and data size. 
This is because embedding a mark always means that some overhead is added to the 
mobile agent. Moreover, a TP (Trusted Third Party) is needed in order to punish malicious 
behaviour. 
3.3.2. Recording and Tracking Technique 
Wayne has proposed a general technique that allows an agent's itinerary to be recorded 
and tracked by another cooperating agent and vice-versa, in a mutually supportive 
arrangement (Wayne, 2000). When moving between agent platforms, an agent conveys 
the last platform, the current platform, and next platform information to the cooperating 
peer through an authenticated channel. The peer maintains a record of the itinerary and 
takes appropriate action when inconsistencies are noted. Attention is paid in this scheme 
so that an agent avoids platforms already visited by its peer.  
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The main advantages of this technique is that by dividing up the operations of the 
application between two agents, certain malicious behaviour of an agent platform can be 
detected. Moreover, this scheme can be incorporated into any appropriate application.  
The main drawback of this technique includes the cost of setting up the authenticated 
channel and the inability of the peer to determine which of the two platforms is 
responsible, if the agent is killed. 
3.3.3. Itinerary Recording with Replication and Voting Technique 
Wayne has proposed a technique (Itinerary Recording with Replication and Voting) for 
detecting malicious behaviour of an agent platform by replicating mobile‐agents and 
voting on results of their computation (Wayne, 2000). 
This technique is based on the idea that instead of using a single copy of an agent to 
perform a computation, multiple copies are used. Although a malicious platform may 
corrupt a few copies of the agent, enough replicas avoid the encounter to successfully 
complete the computation. This technique seems appropriate for specialized applications 
where agents can be duplicated without problems, and the task can be formulated as a 
multi-staged computation. 
The most noticeable advantage of this technique is that this approach is taken similar to 
path histories, but extended with fault tolerant capabilities.  
The major drawback of this technique is that additional resources are consumed by 
replicate agents. 
3.3.4. State Appraisal Technique 
A state appraisal technique has been proposed, wherein an architecture through which 
changes in a mobile‐agent execution states are monitored; it was initially suggested by 
Farmer et al. (Farmer, Guttman and Swarup, 1996). This scheme was specifically designed 
for multi‐hop agent architectures, in which an agent moves through several platforms 
(with various levels of trust) in‐order to perform the required tasks. State appraisal can be 
used to detect tampering on the agent by malicious platforms, so that further damage to 
agent code and information disclosure is minimized. State appraisal requires agents to 
decide on privileges they will need at an intended destination platform. A state appraisal 
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function is used to compute a set of privileges to be requested for, based on the state of the 
agent when it arrives at the new destination platform. Using this state information, 
dangerous modifications to the agent’s state can be detected and appropriate counter 
actions triggered. This technique is implemented as a “layer” above the authentication 
phase during mobile‐agent execution, to provide input to any implemented authorization 
mechanisms, as previously indicated by (Jansen,2000). 
The main challenge to this technique is the large space of appraisal states for an agent, 
which makes it difficult to foresee all forms of attacks that a malicious platform may 
launch. 
3.3.5. Enhanced Reference Monitor based Security Framework 
Akomolafe and Honesty introduced a Trusted Third Party technique designed to allow 
the offloading of the computation-intensive verification mechanism for execution. The 
Trusted Third Party fulfils the requirements of an efficient computing environment to 
mobile agents. Altogether, with the enhanced security framework, it is still possible for a 
mobile agent to migrate to any agent platform (AP) with the assurance of security. The 
enhanced security framework is most suitable for open systems where protection or 
security against malicious hosts and support for mobile agent computing with static as 
well as dynamic itineraries are required (Akomolafe and Honesty, 2017).  The results of 
the approaches have reduced the resource consumption: the memory usage is decreased 
to 35.80% and the time to complete the verification mechanism downgraded to 53.54% 
However, this framework is not tested and integrated with multi-agent systems where 
remote hosts are unknown and untrusted. 
3.3.6. Trusted Hardware technique 
A trusted hardware technique tries to enforce the notion of trust between an agent and a 
host by physically adding, secure – tamper detecting and responding hardware to 
conventional computing systems. The hardware encapsulates the entire environment in 
which the agent executes, creating a safe haven within hosts in the agent space. It protects 
the visiting agent from any possible attack that could be launched by the entertaining host. 
The major drawback of this proposition is that it comes up with another prerequisite for 
an agent, to execute at a given host. After all, all that is all needed for an agent to execute 
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at a given host is the availability of Mobile Agent Platform. But now, the agent also needs 
the existence of the “Safe Heaven” (literally speaking tamper resistant and detecting 
hardware) at each host it is going to visit. This has the effect of constraining the itinerary 
the agent could follow, dramatically limiting the systems’ openness.  
3.3.7. Intrusion Detection Techniques 
Several approaches of mobile agents to intrusion detection have been executed.  
3.3.7.1. Multi-agent-based IDS 
One of the well-known multi-agent-based IDS is the Autonomous Agents for Intrusion 
Detection (AAFID) (Spafford and Zamboni, 2000). Within this architecture, a set of agents 
monitors specific aspects of a machine requiring security. These agents send information 
to the transceivers, which in turn, amalgamate the information and re-send it to the 
monitors. The monitors process this information and decide whether or not an attack has 
occurred. To make the system more scalable, the monitors may be built in layers.  
Although this system was very innovative in its time, its main drawback is the extreme 
rigidity of its architecture, as this makes the introduction of new agents very complicated. 
Moreover, its hierarchy is such that, if an attack manages to deactivate an agent in the 
upper layers, the entire system might be deactivated. 
3.3.7.2. MAIDS Technique 
One of the studies worthy of mention was the MAIDS architecture, proposed in Li et al., 
(2004). The MA-IDS system employed mobile agents to coordinately process information 
from each monitored host. Its architecture includes the Assistant and the Response mobile 
agents. The Assistant mobile agent is dispatched by the manager component to gather 
information in the network. The mobile agents within the MA-IDS system are capable of 
evading attackers and resurrecting themselves if they are attacked. Moreover, the mobility 
of agents makes it possible that distributed intrusion can be detected by means of data 
correlation and cooperative detection.  
However, whenever the location of manager was found by attackers, the IDS faces a 
dangerous situation. Thus, MA-IDS suffers from the drawback of single point of failure. 
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3.3.7.3. Distributed IDS Technique 
Wang et al. proposed a distributed IDS, which includes a Manager and a Host monitor 
(Wang and Hu 2006). The components in such a model are designed as mobile agents for 
the purpose of high adaptability and security of the system. It is claimed that the mobile 
agents of the proposed system can evade intrusion and recover by themselves if they 
suffer from intrusion. Nevertheless, the system uses a control center to carry out the major 
part of the intrusion detection. Consequently, if the location of this center is discovered, 
then the system collapses. 
3.3.7.4. Intrusion Detection Processor (IDP) & Sensors Technique 
Mo et al. implemented a misused mobile agent-based IDS (Mo et al., 2009), which 
incorporates the SNORT system (Roesch, 1999). The architecture consists of three different 
components: (1) an intrusion detection processor (IDP), (2) a mobile agent platform 
(MAP), and (3) distributed sensors or sniffer. Indeed, the IDP is responsible for monitoring 
network segments. Besides, the MAP is responsible for accepting requests made by the 
IDP and generating mobile agents as well as sending them into the network to start 
sniffing activities within the local network, to stop it when necessary, and to send the 
collected data to the IDP for further analysis. Finally, the sniffer is responsible for 
gathering data. The mobile agents in this work are fully managed and network resources 
utilization is saved when there is no attack. However, the proposed system suffers from a 
high false positive rate, since many attacks could be missed. 
3.3.7.5. Simple System for Multi-Agents for IDS 
Ionita describes a simple system based on multi agents for Intrusion Detection, utilized to 
run on general purpose devices such as web servers; this system with considerable 
knowledge is capable to detect port scans and “syn” attacks against a specific port, and it 
is capable of performing actions to prevent the suspicious attack. Also, by using its feature 
of mobility, which is characteristic to mobile agents, the system has capability to protect 
several hosts in a small time frame, by triggering agents which go onto the hosts and reply 
the protective actions has done on the place where the attack was detected initially (Ionita, 
2013). 
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3.3.7.6. Multilayer Detection Technique 
Abdurrazaq, Bambang and Rahardjo propose a multilayer technique with a Multi-agent 
and multilevel technique (Abdurrazaq, Bambang and Rahardjo, 2014). In the 1st level, the 
information is collected; then this information is divided among the multiple agents. They 
have their own rule to verify this. In the second level, the resulting information is gathered 
and passed to the different layers such as application, session and transport. In the third 
level, another algorithm is to detect the intrusion by agent. The benefit of multilevel 
detection process here is that detection is error- free and all the low-level and high-level 
intrusion is detected by the different level.  
However, the drawback of this technique is that it is appropriate to any application. 
The following table 3-1 summarizes the comparative analysis of approaches of securing 
mobile agents. 
 
Table 3-1 Comparative Analysis of Security Solutions to Protect Mobile Agents 
Proposed 
Mechanisms 
Parameters 
Protect 
Masquerading 
Protect 
Eavesdropping 
Protect 
Unauthorized 
Access 
Protect 
DOS 
Protect 
Copy & 
Replay 
Detect 
Tampering 
Implementation 
Available 
Trusted 
Hardware 
Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mutual 
Itinerary 
Recording 
No No No No No Yes Yes 
Itinerary 
Recording  with 
Replication & 
Voting 
No No No No No Yes Yes 
Computing with 
Encrypted 
Functions 
No YES Partial NO NO NO YES 
Partial Result 
Encapsulation 
YES 
Yes 
(Encryption) 
Partial 
Yes 
(Encryption) 
Yes Partial YES 
Partial Result 
Authentification 
Codes 
No N Partial No No Partial YES 
Environmtal 
Key Generation 
Yes Yes Partial No No Partial No 
Execution 
Tracing 
Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No 
Obfuscated 
code 
No Yes 
Yes (Limited 
Time) 
No No 
Yes 
(Limited 
Time) 
Yes 
 
CHAPTER 3 : LITERATURE REVIEW     
 
41 
 
3.4. Current Divergence Measures and Sketch Technique 
Several researches have been done on detection of anomalies in IP networks using 
divergence measures and sketch technique.  
Existing methods for anomaly detection are based on different techniques, such as Haar-
wavelet Analysis Entropy based method and Holt-Winters Seasonal Forecasting Method. 
Haussler and Opper compare two different algorithms (CUSUM and Adaptive Threshold) 
for the detection of SYN flooding attack. They conclude that CUSUM performs better than 
Adaptive Threshold, in terms of detection accuracy of low intensity attacks. However, 
both of these algorithms face problems of false alarm ratio under normal IP traffic 
variation.  
Other work aggregates the whole traffic in one time series, and applies a change point 
detection algorithm to detect the instant of anomaly occurrence. The latter has good 
performance in terms of spatial and temporal complexities, but presents the drawback of 
aggregating all traffic in one flow, where low intensity attacks cannot be detected. 
Furthermore, these methods use static threshold for detecting anomalies, which is not 
adequate with traffic variations, and may induce false alarm and miss detection. 
 
Sketch data structure uses the random aggregation for more grained analysis than 
aggregating the whole traffic in one time series. It has been used to summarize monitored 
traffic in a fixed memory, and to provide scalable input for time series analysis. Tang and 
Zhou propose the use of Cumulative SUM (CUSUM) over the sketch for network anomaly 
detection, (Tang and Zhou, 2009). Furthermore, they propose a new mechanism for Sketch 
inversion and malicious flows identification. Then, the Sketch data structure to derive 
probability distributions is exploited. 
 
In addition, recent work experiments the histogram-based detector in order to detect the 
anomaly behaviours and changes in traffic distributions. They apply Kullback-Leibler 
divergence between the current and previous measurement distributions. 
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Wijesekera, Duminda and Jjodia apply Hellinger distance (HD) on Sketch data structure, 
in order to detect divergence between current and previous distributions of the number 
of SIP INVITE request (Wijesekera, Duminda and Jjodia, 2008). In fact, HD must be near 
zero when probability distributions are similar, and it increases up to one, whenever the 
distributions diverge (e.g. under Invite flooding attacks). In addition, they used the 
dynamic threshold proposed during their experimental analysis. 
 
Ehlert, Wang, Magedanz and Sisalem presented a scheme to detect the SIP flooding DoS 
attacks. SIP transactional models are built to detect deviations from normal behaviors 
(Ehlert, Wang, Magedanz and  Sisalem, 2008). However, these schemes are customized 
specifically to the SIP protocol and cannot be easily generalized to be applied in other 
flooding detection case.  
 
All the above mentioned studies used the divergence measures and sketch technique to 
detect anomalies in IP Networks.  
Based on these techniques, the aim of the thesis  is to integrate these methods for detection 
of malicious hosts, not only in IP/SIP Network, but in a very specific one which is the 
mobile agent network .  
3.5. Motivation for Improving the Protection of Mobile Agents  
Based on what is shown in the previous section, it is clear that the existing solutions for 
protection and detection of mobile agents present many limitations. 
For the protection system the many drawbacks can be summarised as below: 
 Computation load and code is large (Abolfazl and Ali, 2009) 
 Some computing with encrypted functions is not capable to Protect the system from 
denial of service (Mousa and Ljiljana, 2005). 
 Efficiency of some these solutions, i.e generated sub-agent mechanism, are very low 
(D’Anna, 2003). 
For the Intrusion Detection System, many disadvantages can be summarised as below: 
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 Lack of Efficiency: Host-based IDSs often slow down a system and network-based 
IDSs drop network packets that they don't have time to process (Spafford and 
Zamboni, 2000). 
 High Number of False Positives: False alarms are high and attack recognition is not 
perfect (Duraipandian and Palanisamy, 2014). 
 Spend a huge amount of money and time to be deployed (Mirkovic and Reiher, 2005). 
 Limited Flexibility: Intrusion detection systems have typically been written for a 
specific environment (Abdurrazaq, Bambang and Rahardjo, 2014). 
 Limited Response Capability: IDSs have traditionally focused on detecting attacks. 
While detection serves a useful purpose, often times a system administrator is not able 
to immediately analyse the reports from IDS and take appropriate action. 
 No Generic Building Methodology: In general, the cost of building IDS from available 
components is considerable, due, in large part, to the absence of a structured 
methodology. 
These drawbacks motivate to propose solutions for the protection of mobile agents over 
malicious hosts. Table 3-2 presents a summary of drawbacks and advantages of the 
discussed detection and protection techniques. 
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Table 3-2 Detection and protection Drawbacks Techniques 
Techniques Category Advantages Drawbacks 
Distributed Technique 
for Multi-Agents 
Protection 
double encryption used  
is used 
Increase in 
Computation 
Environmental Key 
Generation  
Protection 
Passwords are 
maintained in modern 
operating systems  
Limitation of MA to  
execute the  code 
dynamically 
Software solution for 
secure execution of 
mobile agents under 
untrusted execution 
environment  
Protection 
MA executes in secure 
manner at remote 
untrusted platforms. 
Not able to protect 
against DDOS 
 Obfuscation Protection 
Low maintenance  due to 
automation of the 
transformation process  
Required additional 
memory and 
computation time  
Watermarking and 
Fingerprinting  
Detection 
Agent’s execution 
creates marked results 
Increase in code and 
data size 
 Recording and 
Tracking  
Detection 
Malicious behavior of an 
agent platform can be 
detected & incorporated 
into any application 
Required additional 
materials for setting up 
the authenticated 
channel 
Itinerary Recording 
with Replication and 
Voting  
Detection Fault tolerant capabilities 
Additional memory 
required and increase 
in  computation 
State Appraisal  Detection 
Detect tampering on the 
agent  
Difficult to foresee all 
forms of attacks  
Multi-agent-based IDS  Detection 
Capable of evading 
attackers and 
resurrecting themselves 
if they are attacked 
Rigidity of its 
architecture 
Distributed IDS Detection 
Can evade intrusion and 
recover by themselves if 
they suffer from 
intrusion 
location of this If the 
center is discovered, 
then the system 
collapses 
 
The proposed new computing model, for protecting against malicious hosts, is based on 
trust where  it is combination of two kinds of trust: policy enforcement and one based on 
control and punishment. A detailed description of this approach, as well as its 
implementation and a test against malicious hosts will be performed in order to verify the 
robustness of the approach. 
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This new model for detecting these malicious hosts, is proposed and is based on 
Divergence measures (Power Divergences, Hellinger Distance and Chi-square) and sketch 
technique. This type of integration can be considered as unique in comparison with all 
existing solutions. The performance of the proposed model is investigated in terms of 
detection probability and false alarm ratio. A focus on tuning the parameter of Divergence 
Measures to optimize the performance will be provided. Then, performance analysis over 
publicly available real IP traces, in Mobile Agent Network, integrated with flooding 
attacks is conducting.  Finally, an evaluation of the performance of the proposed 
divergence measure via the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) will be performed. 
3.6. Summary  
This chapter has given an overview of existing detection and protection mechanisms on 
mobile agents. It has addressed the main issues in the area.  Moreover, it has shown the 
necessity of providing a new approaches of protecting mobile agent’s world against 
malicious hosts.  An overview of the previous works in the area of protection, detection of 
mobile agents as well as the existing divergence measures and sketch technique has been 
given. The next chapter will give an overview of MA systems.   
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  Chapter 4 : Detection 
Proposed Model 
 
4.1. Introduction 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, networks have become more and more advanced 
in terms of their size, complexity, increased number of users and devices and the level of 
heterogeneity. Delay, jitter, quality of service, availability are the most significant 
challenges in any network.  
 
The Client-Server (CS) model is suitable for small and limited applications or network. 
Undoubtedly, this limits the flexibility with which a client can use a server, by processing 
the server data locally according to the client's needs. 
 
The concept of a Mobile Agent (MA) has been introduced, which could migrate between 
nodes, carrying the necessary code to be executed (Nikaein, 1999). MAs offer a real benefit 
to the system developers and the users; this application specifying which parameters can 
be improved upon, for example performance, connectivity, reliability and modularity. The 
importance of these key parameters may vary from one application to another. MAs with 
integral intelligence can present a reasonably new technology that will generously help to 
achieve distributed management; several researchers have embraced these approaches. 
However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, MA has a big concern in the security 
realm. 
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In this Chapter, the techniques to be used in order to detect against flooding attacks in 
mobile agent network will be introduced, viz., Sketch technique, Divergence measures 
(Chi-square, Power Divergence and Hellinger Distance) as well as the Dynamic 
Threshold. A new model for detection of attacks is proposed. Experimental results will be 
shown in detail in Chapter 6. We will expressly propose how to build up an analytical 
model, which can be used to quantitatively assess the performances of the MA and CS 
paradigms under different scenarios.  
4.2. Theoretical Background 
4.2.1. Sketch Techniques  
In this section, the K-ary Sketch data structure is going to be reviewed. Using the Sketch 
data structure makes the model flexible and scalable for grained analysis. No matter how 
many flows exist in the traffic, Sketch generates fixed-number of time instances for 
anomaly detection. Sketch provides more grained analysis than aggregating whole traffic 
in one-time instances (Thorup and Zhang, 2004). 
 
The Sketch data structure is used for dimensionality reduction. It is based on random 
aggregation of traffic attribute (e.g. number of packets) in different hash tables. A Sketch 
S is a 2D array of H × K cell (as shown in Figure 4-1), where K is the size of the hash table, 
and H is the number of mutual independent hash functions (universal hash functions). 
Each item is identified by a key 𝐾𝑛 and associated with a reward value 𝑉𝑛. For each new 
arriving item (𝐾𝑛, 𝑉𝑛), the associated value will be added to the cell𝑆[𝑖][𝑗], where i is an 
index used to represent the hash function associated with ith hash table (0 ≤ i ≤ d − 1), and 
j is the hash value (𝑗 = 𝐻𝑖 (𝐾𝑛)) of the key by the ith hash function. 
 
Data items, whose keys are hashed to the same value, will be aggregated in the same cell 
in the hash table, and their values will be added up to existing counter in the hash table. 
Each hash table (or each row) is used to derive probability distribution as the ratio of the 
counter in each cell to the sum of whole cell in the line.  
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Figure 4-1 : Sketch Data structure 
Let the Mobile Agents be the input stream to the detection system. Time is divided into 
discrete intervals and each interval is of a fixed length Δt. In each detection cycle, the data 
being analyzed  is organised into a training set and a test set. The training period consists 
of n consecutive time intervals and the test period is the interval right after. 
 
Assuming, there is no attack in the initial training set. An H × K sketch from the set for the 
Mobile Agents’ messages is built. The Mobile Agents addresses of the senders  are used 
as the hash keys. For messages hashed to the same position in a sketch table, the total 
number of them will be the value of that entry.  
 
For the H × K table of the training set, a probability distribution P1 from the first row of it 
is obtained. In order to achieve this, suppose the values of the K entries are (n1, n2... nK), 
These values are added  up and get a number N. Thus, the distribution 𝑃1 can be defined 
as:  
𝑃1 =  (
𝑛1
𝑁
,
𝑛2
𝑁
, … ,
𝑛𝑘
𝑁
) (1)  
 
Similarly, for the H×K table of the test set, a distribution Q1 from its first row is obtained. 
Suppose the values of the K entries are (m1, m2… mK). These values are added up and 
get another number M. Thus, the distribution 𝑄1 can be defined as:  
 
𝑄1 =  (
𝑚1
𝑀
,
𝑚2
𝑀
, … ,
𝑚𝑘
𝑀
) (2)  
 
The derived probability distributions (K probability set, one per line) are used as inputs 
for divergence measures; they will be described in the following sections. 
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4.2.2. Threshold 
In order to differentiate network anomalies from normal behaviour on the mobile agent, 
the use of a detection threshold for Power Divergence (𝑃𝐷) is mandatory.  
Instead of using a static threshold, the Exponential Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) 
is adapted.  
Let 𝑃𝐷(n) be the current value of the Power Divergence. 𝑃𝐷(n) and 𝑃𝐷(n+1) are 
respectively the current and next exponentially weighted average estimates of Power 
Divergence. Let α (n) be the deviation between the current Power measure 𝑃𝐷(n) and the 
average measure ˉPD(n). The exponentially weighted average of ơ(n) is denoted byˉơ(n). 
ˉơ  measures how much ˉPD(n + 1) deviates from PD(n). 
The estimated threshold h(n + 1) is then given as follows: 
 
ˉPD(n + 1) = (1 − α) . ˉPD(n) +  α  .  PD(n)            (3) 
α(n) =  ˉPD(n) − 𝑃𝐷(𝑛)                                                 (4) 
ˉơ(n + 1) = (1 − α)  .  ˉơ(n) +  α  .  ơ(n)                   (5) 
h(n + 1) = λ  .  ˉPD(n + 1) +  μ  . ˉơ(n + 1)             (6) 
 
The principle of using EWMA here is to forecast future values based on current values. 
Given ˉPD(n + 1) andˉơ(n + 1), the estimated Threshold h(n + 1) can then be computed. 
In order to avoid false alarms, the threshold should be greater than divergence measure 
in normal situation.  
 
Two parameters λ and μ then come into play to set a safe margin for the threshold. The 
parameters α, β, λ and μ are all tunable parameters in the model. Proper values will be set 
for them in the experiments, in order to improve the detection accuracy. 
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4.2.3. Mathematical Algorithms 
These measures are used to detect the DDoS attacks based on the deviation of traffic 
distribution. In fact, the idea is to compare the prior distribution derived from Sketch 
counters in previous time slot, with the currently obtained distribution. One can use this 
change to detect flooding attack, because the counter of one cell will increase significantly 
with the number of sent requests, and the probability distribution deviates at the start and 
stop instances of the flooding attack. 
4.2.3.1. Chi-Square 
𝑥2 divergence is used to measure distance between two discrete probability distributions 
(P and Q). For 2 probability sets 𝑃 = (𝑃1, 𝑃2, 𝑃3 … 𝑃𝑛) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑄 = (𝑄1, 𝑄2, 𝑄3 … 𝑄𝑛), with 𝑃𝑖 
≥ 0, 𝑄𝑖 ≥ 0 & ∑ 𝑝𝑖 = ∑ 𝑞𝑖 = 1    𝑘−1𝑖=0
𝑘−1
𝑖=0            
The Pearson 𝑥2  divergence between 𝑃 and 𝑄 is given by: 
𝑥2 (𝑃||𝑄) =  ∑
(𝑃𝑖 − 𝑄𝑖)2
𝑄𝑖
    (7)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
where 𝑄 is the estimated probability distribution and 𝑃 is the measured probability.                         
Distribution, and 𝑥2  (𝑃 ||𝑄) is the distance between distributions 𝑃 and 𝑄. 
For hypothesis testing, such as 𝐻0 (normal traffic hypothesis) and 𝐻1 (traffic with 
anomalies), 𝑥2 values can run from zero into infinity. 𝑥2 will be zero if 𝑃 and 𝑄 are 
identical (𝑃𝑖 = 𝑄𝑖) under hypothesis 𝐻0, and 𝑥2  increases as the distributions become 
dissimilar, and eventually so high (infinity) when the two distributions are independent 
(𝑃 ≠ 𝑄)under hypothesis 𝐻1. It is important to note that 𝑥2  divergence is non-negative 
and the division 0/0 is treated as 0, and the division by zero is replaced by a very small 
value ε. 
The 𝑥2  divergence between 2 probability distributions 𝑃 and 𝑄 must be near zero under 
normal traffic, with a large deviation (one spike) when distributions change occurs. 𝑥2  is 
asymmetric (𝑥2  𝑃 ||𝑄) ≠ 𝑥2  (𝑄 ||𝑃)), and its symmetric version raises two spikes.  One 
spike at the beginning and the second at the end of the attack. 
𝑥2 (𝑃||𝑄) +  𝑥2 (𝑄||𝑃) =  ∑
(𝑃𝑖 − 𝑄𝑖)2 + (𝑃𝑖 + 𝑄𝑖)  
𝑃𝑖 ∗ 𝑄𝑖
    (8)
𝑛
𝑖=1
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Pearson chi-square divergence (asymmetric) is used to detect anomaly through the 
detection of deviations from normal traffic profile. Then, the input time series is modified 
to constrain 𝑥2  to raise alarms (spikes) for the whole duration of attack. Leorato and 
Broniatowski (M. Broniatowski and S. Leorato, 2006) proved that 𝑥2  divergence behaves 
better than all classical divergences (Hellinger distance, Kullback-Leibler, Likelihood, etc.   
4.2.3.2. Hellinger Distance 
Hellinger Distance (𝐻𝐷) is used to measure the divergence between two sets of probability 
values.  
For two discrete probability distributions 𝑃 = (𝑃1, 𝑃2, 𝑃3 … 𝑃(𝑘 − 1)) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑄 =
(𝑄1, 𝑄2, 𝑄3 … 𝑄(𝑘 − 1)), with 𝑃𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝑄𝑖 ≥ 0 and  
∑ 𝑝𝑖 = ∑ 𝑞𝑖 = 1    
𝑘−1
𝑖=0
𝑘−1
𝑖=0
 
The HD between current distribution P and prior distribution Q is defined as:  
𝐻𝐷 (𝑃, 𝑄) =
1
2
∑(√𝑝𝑖 − √𝑞𝑖)2   (9)
𝑘−1
1=0
 
where 𝐻𝐷 satisfies the inequality 0 ≤ 𝐻𝐷 (𝑃, 𝑄) ≤ 1, and 𝐻𝐷 (𝑃, 𝑄) = 0 if 𝑃 =𝑄. 𝐻𝐷 is a 
symmetric distance (e.g.  𝐻𝐷 (𝑃, 𝑄) = 𝐻𝐷 (𝑄, 𝑃)) and induces two spikes, one at the 
beginning of change, and the second at the end of the change  (Hemant Sengar,Duminda 
Wijesekera, Sushil Jjodia, June, 2008). 
4.2.3.3. Power Divergence 
Rathie and Kannappan  have defined he Power Divergence and equivalent variants (up 
to a scale factor𝛽) of this divergence (P. N. Rathie and P. Kannappan,1972). The divergence 
measure is therefore the decision measure that generalizes the Kullback-Leibler measure 
and Hellinger distance to a broad class of divergence of order𝛽. In fact, the Power 
Divergence is a measure of distance between two probability measures of order 𝛽 given 
as follows: 
𝑃𝐷 (𝑃||𝑄) = 
∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑤𝑖=1  (𝑃𝑖/𝑄𝑖)
𝛽−1−1
𝛽 (𝛽−1)
           (10) 
where 𝑃 is the posterior probability distribution and 𝑄 is the prior probability distribution. 
This divergence presents some interesting special cases.  
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For 𝛽 = 0.5, this divergence is 4 x  𝐻𝐷 (𝑃 || 𝑄), and for 𝛽 = 2 it is equal to 0.5 x  𝑥2  (𝑃 || 𝑄) 
divergence. Obviously, this power divergence outperforms then the 𝑥2 and HD measures 
(some results will be provided later in the paper).In fact, by changing the values of 𝛽, one 
can optimize the detection of attacks compared to the 𝑥2 and 𝐻𝐷 measures.  
 
The experiments work will show numerically that for different values of 𝛽, the detection 
efficiency changes. The optimal value of 𝛽 then can then be obtained. 
𝑃 and 𝑄 are derived from the Sketch data structure in two consecutive discrete intervals. 
Firstly, the shared counters of the sketch are continuously updated from ongoing traffic 
during a time interval T. At the end of each interval, the probability Pi,j is calculated as the 
ratio of each counter to the sum of the whole counters in one hash table: 
𝑃𝑖, 𝑗 =  
𝑆 [𝑖][𝑗]
∑ 𝑆 [𝑖][𝑗]𝑤𝑗=1
            (11) 
The probability distributions d in each interval(𝑃1 … 𝑃𝑑) is obtained, where Pi is the 
distribution (𝑃1 … 𝑃𝑑) resulted from the 𝑖𝑡ℎ hash table. Qi is the probability distributions 
resulted from previous interval. The probability distributions of Qi is calculated in the 
same manner as 𝑃𝑖 (Eq. 2). 
 
When the Power Divergence is larger than dynamically updated threshold, an alarm will 
be raised. However, Power Divergence induces only two spikes (at the start and at the end 
of attack). As the goal is to continuously raise alarms for whole duration of the attack, the 
distribution Qi will stop sliding by keeping its value until the end of the attack. However, 
with the variations of normal traffic and the similarity of DDoS attacks with flash crowd, 
Flooding attacks is supposed to span for many intervals, in contrast to flash crowd and 
normal variation. Thus, the false alarms is reduced. Therefore, an alarm will be triggered 
only if the deviation lasts more than Δ intervals. 
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4.3. Proposed Approach 
This section explains, in detail, the contribution on how to integrate Sketch technique and 
divergence measures (Hellinger Distance, Power Divergence and Chi-square) in favour of 
detecting anomalies in Mobile Agent networks (Figure. 4-2). 
 
Mobile Agent Traffic
Divide the Traffic into Random T Intervals Using Sketch Technique
Time == kT
Probability Distribution using Divergence Measures: Power Divergence, Hellinger Distance, Chi-Square
Dynamic Threshold (EWMA) and Detection of False Positive Ratio
Anomaly Detection
 
Figure 4-2 : Proposed Algorithm for Network Anomaly Detection. 
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1. The detection system begins first by recording the number of monitored points (e.g. 
#packets, #SYN, #flows, etc.) in the Sketch for each discrete time interval T. Random 
aggregation of traffic flows in Sketch is the first step of the processing, followed by 
time instances forecasting with divergence measures. 
 
2. During each interval, the destination IP address (DIP) for each packet containing a 
SYN segment, is hashed by 𝐻 hash functions. The resulting hash value by the 𝑖𝑡ℎ 
function (𝐽 = 𝐻𝑖(DIP)) is used as index of the associated counter 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗 with DIP. Each 
arriving SYN segment increments the associated counter.  
The analysis will be focused on TCP SYN flooding by counting the number of SYN. 
At the end of each epoch 𝑇, the probability distributions is derived via the Sketch 
technique. At first, the sum of the counter in each line is developed, and the probability 
Pi,j in each cell is calculated as the ratio of each counter to the total number of SYN: 
 
              
Each cell 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗  becomes a data structure that contains current counter, current and 
previous probabilities. Therefore, each line (or hash table) provides two probability 
distributions: the first one is from previous interval and used as reference 
distribution𝑄𝑖. The second one is from current interval𝑃𝑖, and used to measure the 
divergence from the reference distribution, in order to detect anomalies. Divergence 
measures between the current (𝑃𝑖) and reference probability (𝑄𝑖) distributions is 
calculated for each line in the Sketch, at the end of each time interval (i.e. at n.𝑇 ). 
During malicious activities, the divergence measure 𝐷(𝑃𝑖||𝑄𝑖) produces spikes, and 
when more than 𝐿 (𝐿 <𝐻) divergences resulted from different hash tables exceed a 
dynamic threshold, an alarm is raised. 
To detect deviations in the time instances resulted from divergence measures, a 
subsequent time instances containing the values of 𝐷(𝑃𝑖||𝑄𝑖) without spikes is 
derived.  
 
 
 
𝑃𝑖, 𝑗 = 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗. 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 ∑ 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗. 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟   (12)
𝑘−1
𝑗=0
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3. In this last time instances (without large values), a dynamic bound of 𝜇𝑖 +  𝛼𝜎𝑖 is 
defined. Significant deviations are larger than the dynamic bound: 
 
                                                                    
where 𝐷(𝑃𝑖||𝑄𝑖) is the divergence measure in the time interval n.𝑇 for the 𝑖𝑡ℎ  line in 
the Sketch, and 𝜇𝑖 & 𝛼𝜎𝑖  are the mean and the standard deviation respectively of 
smoothed time instances that do not contain spikes (𝐷 ^ ( 𝑃𝑖||𝑄𝑖)). μi and σi are 
updated dynamically using the Weighted Average (EWMA): 
 
 
 
 
 
The threshold is updated dynamically with the value of 𝜇𝑖 and 𝜎𝑖 as shown in above 
equations. 𝛼 is a parameter used for calibrating the sensitivity of the detection algorithm 
to variations. It is also used to reduce the false alarm rate. Under normal traffic, divergence 
𝐷(𝑃𝑖||𝑄𝑖) falls inside the bound of 𝜇𝑖 +  2𝜎𝑖 . When 𝐷(𝑃𝑖||𝑄𝑖) exceeds the dynamically 
updated threshold over L lines, an alarm is triggered. 
 
The solution for the detection of attacks is developed using C++ Code. It is located in 
Appendix F. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝐷 (𝑃𝑖||𝑄𝑖) > 𝜇𝑖 +  𝛼𝜎𝑖    (13) 
𝜇𝑖 =  𝛽𝜇(𝑖 − 1) + (1 − 𝛽) 𝐷^(𝑃𝑖||𝑄𝑖)            (14) 
𝜎𝑖2 = 𝛽𝜎(𝑖 − 1)2+(1-𝛽)(𝐷^(𝑃𝑖||𝑄𝑖) − 𝜇𝑖) 
2
  (15) 
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4.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the techniques that will be used for the new proposed 
approach for the detection of attacks and anomalies in the mobile agent world.  
This model is based on sketch technique (Hash functions), divergence measure (Hellinger 
Distance, Chi-square and Power Divergence) and dynamic threshold (Jacobson Fast 
algorithm for RTT (Round - Trip Time)). The last section of this chapter has described in 
detail, the process and modelling of the proposed solution.   
 
The strength of this model, in comparison of the existing solutions, is the accuracy of the 
detection of anomalies in terms of false alarm. This will be shown and verified in Chapter 
7. The above described divergence measures will be tested via several scenarios in order 
to know which one can provide better performance in detection of anomalies, with less 
false alarm ratio. These evaluations will be done via the receiver operating characteristic 
(ROC).
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 Chapter 5 : Protection 
Proposed Model 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter has presented a new method for the detection of attacks against 
mobile agents. This chapter will focus on and develop a new way of protection against 
malicious host in mobile agents’ network. This new approach will be delineated in detail 
in the following sections. 
 
The proposed countermeasure is based on trust. A mobile agent can host either blind 
folded, based on policy enforcement, or based on control and punishment.  
  
 A Mobile Agent is blind folded, which “simply need to trust its entertaining host”. The 
host is free to do whatever it wants while giving services to the Mobile Agent. But it is 
trusted that it neither has malicious behaviour nor does it collaborate with other hostile 
hosts that perform some bad actions on the agent.  
 
Policy enforcement is another trust. In this case, the Mobile Agent and the host have a 
prior contractual relationship in the form of policy. Both parties need to sign for their rights 
and obligations.  
 
The last trust is control and punishment. There is no needed policy to be signed between 
the two parties as well as there is no contract signed. The trust assumes that hosts are not 
by nature malicious and give them a chance to behave accordingly. But it still uses control 
mechanism to punish the host if found guilty of misbehaviours. 
The proposed solution is a combination of policy enforcement and control and punishment.  
The below section outlines the guidelines used to develop the countermeasure. 
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5.2. Design Guidelines 
The following points are used as guideline when the proposition is being developed: 
 Convenience to the home of the agent: Once the home of the agent sends the MA, he 
does not have to worry anymore about whereabouts of the agent. All that he needs is 
the agent to return with its result; nothing more. 
 Abstraction of the modification: The home of the agent does not have to feel the 
difference between the proposed and the normal mobile agent operation and 
computation 
 No pre-negotiation with hosts: The mobile agent should be able to freely roam inside 
the agent space, without a prior agreement between the set of hosts to be visited and 
the user of the mobile agent. 
 Ease of access of information gathered: Once the mobile agent returns to its home,  the 
user should be able to retrieve the information gathered from the data carried back by 
the mobile agent, without any  need to contact the hosts involved. 
5.3. Components of the Proposed Countermeasure Model 
This section will look at the main components of the proposed countermeasure approach 
and how should the components interact according to the security model. 
 
Figure 5-2 shows the overall view of the model; it shows that the countermeasure 
constitutes various components at various degree of multiplicity.  
Below is the component of the proposed approach: 
 Home of the Mobile Agent 
 Mobile Agent (MA) 
 Trusted Node 
 Active Storage Element 
 Home 
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5.3.1. Home of the Mobile Agent (Home) 
It is the computer running mobile agent platform and has sent the mobile agent to carry 
out a task on its behalf. It can also be defined as a computer running a mobile agent based 
distributed application. The application as a part of its mission packs a task into the mobile 
agent and sends it to the agent space. The mobile agent after completing its task will 
eventually return to the home, carrying the result. 
5.3.2. Mobile Agent 
As defined throughout this thesis, it is a program that migrates from one node to another 
node in a computer network to accomplish a task. 
5.3.3. Trusted Node 
It is similar in composition to the home of the mobile agent, but differs in the function it 
provides. It is there to provide support and service to the mobile agent while it is in the 
agent space. 
5.3.4. Active Storage Element 
It is a temporary storage element that is created by each mobile agent, at the trusted server, 
that is sent to visit nodes in the agent space. It actively participates in the process of 
temporary information storage and handing over of all the information to the mobile 
agent. 
5.3.5. Host 
It is a computer in the agent space running mobile agent platform and entertains any 
visiting mobile agent which would like to gather information from it. This component is 
at the center of the controversy, which could be hostile. The host provides all the necessary 
resources for the agent to execute there. 
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5.4. Proposed Countermeasure Model 
Mobile Agents are subjected to any type of attacks because they are a ‘lonely figure’, once 
sent to the agent space. Hence, the proposition modifies the computing model of the 
mobile computation in order to address hostile host threats.  
 
The computational model of the original mobile agent system consists of home of the 
mobile agent, computers in the agent space (hosts) and the mobile agent itself. In this 
model, the mobile agent visits nodes (hosts) that are in the agent space, dictated by its 
list of destinations, gets the data, carries it around as it visits other nodes and will 
eventually return to its sending node with the result. This is an overall view of the 
computing model of the original setup as shown in Figure 5-1. 
Home (Starting Point) Host #1 Host #N
Mobile Agent
Mobile Agent
Mobile Agent
 
Figure 5-1:  Existing Mobile Agent Computing Model 
 
Figure 5-2 shows an overview of the mobile computing model. It is mandatory that the 
home of the Mobile Agent has a public-private key pair at its disposal, the public key is 
published to the world so that the Mobile Agent could retrieve this key while it is visiting 
hosts. These keys are used by the security model to protect the confidentiality and the 
integrity of parts of the Mobile Agent.  
The model modifies the way by which the mobile computation is done.  
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Home
Host #1
Host #3
Host #5
Trusted Server
CA
Key
Key
(1)
(5)
(4)
(3)
(2)
Mobile Agent
Mobile Agent
 
Figure 5-2 : Proposed new model 
The process is described as below: 
(1)  The arrows dictate that the Mobile Agent first goes to the trusted node. 
(2)  Creates a temporary storage element called active storage element (ASE). 
(3) Then moves to the first host to be visited. It goes there, sends the information it has 
retrieved from the corresponding host to be stored temporarily at ASE. The trusted node 
accepts the information and stores it. Each Mobile Agent that has a trust relationship with 
this node does the same, creates its own ASE at the trusted node and uses it to store the 
partial information it retrieves from each hosts.  
(4) In the end, the Mobile Agent returns to the trusted node and asks the corresponding 
ASE to hand it over the results it has been accumulating so far. 
(5)  It carries the result back to its home as if it has been doing the job also. 
It is assumed that the agent space is divided into regions; within each region, a node called 
trusted server is setup. These servers provide various services to the Mobile Agent while 
the agent is in the agent space. The Mobile Agent supported by these trusted nodes should 
be able to avert some of the evil acts from hostile hosts. The division of the agent space 
into regions is analogous to the cells in the mobile communication systems.  
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Nowadays, it is common to introduce trusted server setup in a network handled by a third 
party. Plenty of servers deployed in the internet word uses a trusted server like Web 
servers, mail servers and Domain Name Services (DNS) servers. Trusted servers do not 
have the right to modify the Mobile Agent’s content, as web servers do not modify the 
web page they host. But here the security model provides further protection to the Mobile 
Agent content at the trusted server. It is such a similar concept that the proposition wants 
to exploit. The nodes and the trusted servers could be set up, in a similar style as nodes of 
root Web servers, by the Mobile Agent user community.  
5.5. Security Model 
A security model defines how components of the system (Home, Trusted Nodes and 
Active Storage Element) should interact with each other as well as, what the necessary 
tasks need  to be performed are at each level in order to secure the network from any 
malicious actions.  
The security model is free to take or alter any action on the Mobile Agent. While the Mobile 
Agent is travelling between its home and trusted nodes, the usual composition is deemed. 
But when the agent is visiting different nodes, it is assumed to be composed of only the 
two out of the three components that is usually associated with code and state, to give 
hostile hosts no chance of disclosure of information collected from previous hosts. 
 
Another function of the security model is to develop a mechanism that lets the user of the 
Mobile Agent to digitally sign the list of destinations it wants the Mobile Agent to visit. 
After creating the list of destination, it digitally signs the destination object using its private 
key, then the destination object is passed down to the Mobile Agent. The Mobile Agent, 
upon its arrival at each host in the network, verifies that it has a valid copy of the 
destination object before putting that object into use. By this, the Mobile Agent avoids the 
possibility that it would be directed to visit other hosts by altering the list of paths it has 
carried from its home, as any malicious host could not forge the digitally signed 
destination object.  
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The security model can be found in every step in the agent trip in the network. It is 
assumed that, the home node has a public-private key pair (HPubK-HPrvK).The public 
key could be retrieved by the hosts from relevant authorities. 
5.5.1. At Home  
The user of the Multi-Agents System (MAS) specifies the address of the list of hosts that 
will visit, using the Agent Based Application (ABA).  
 
The ABA takes the list and forms a destination object. The destination object contains the 
list of hosts to be visited, the address of the trusted server (TS) and the home. The ABA 
then digitally signs the destination object and passes it to the MAS. The MAS accepts the 
signed object. By using HPubK, the MAS verifies that it has the right un-signed destination 
object, from which the address of the next node to be visited is determined and dispatches 
itself to that node; as pointed out in the previous section, it goes first to the Trusted Node, 
as given in Figure 5-3. 
 
Figure 5-3: Proposed Model at Home 
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5.5.2. At Trusted Server 
The MAS arrives at the TS. It creates its own Active Storage Element (ASE). The MAS 
passes down the necessary information to the ASE, so it can communicate with it. The 
MAS retrieves the public key of the home, HPubK. Using this key, the MAS un-signs the 
digitally signed- destination object and determines the next node to be visited. In this case, 
it is the first host in the list and the MA Dispatches itself to that node, as delineated in  
Figure. 5-4.  
MA arrives from 
Home
ASE Created by MA to store the 
information temporary in the TS 
Important data passed to 
ASE 
Unsigning the Destination 
object using HPubK to get 
the next node 
MA goes to the first  Host
Signed
Public/Private Key
Signed
IP@:TS  
IP @: Host #1 
IP @:Host #2 
IP @: Host #n 
Signed
IP@:TS  
IP @: Host #1 
IP @:Host #2 
IP @: Host #n 
 
Figure 5-4:  Proposed Model at Trusted Server 
5.5.3. At ith Host   
 The MA arrives at the ith host, Host_i. 
 It generates a random symmetric key, SymK_i.  
 The MA retrieves the public key of the home, HPubK. 
 Asks the host about the information it wants, Info_i. 
 Encrypts the information using the symmetric, SymK_i(Info_i). 
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 Encrypts the randomly generated symmetric key using the public key, 
HPubK(SymK_i). 
 Sends both of these information, HPubK(SymK_i) and SymK_i(Info_i), to its ASE 
at the TS to be stored temporarily. 
 The MA unsigns its destination object, looks the address of the next node to be 
visited and dispatches itself to that node. At Trusted Server, after reach of the 
trusted server. Please see figure 5-5. 
 
MA arrives from 
TS
Generates randomly symmetric key , 
SymK_i and retrieves the
HPubK
The MA retrieves the info it 
wanted and encrypts it using 
SymK_i
Unsigning the Destination 
object using HPubK to get 
the next node to be visited
MA goes to the node
Signed The MA encrypts SymK_i using
HPubK and send these information 
to ASE
Public/Private Key Info_i
To TS
SymK_i SymK_i(Info_i)
HPubK(SymK_i) SymK_i(Info_i)
 
Figure 5-5:  Security Model at the ith Host. 
5.5.4. At Trusted Server 
If the next node is another host; it does the same task as indicated above. Or else, if it is a 
trusted server, the following set of actions follows. 
The MAS arrives at the TS. It asks the corresponding ASE to hand it the information it has 
been accumulating (a pair of HPubK(SymK_i) and SymK_i(Info_i) retrieved from each 
host), and takes these pieces of information. After un-signing its destination object, it looks 
CHAPTER 5 : PROTECTION PROPOSED MODEL    
 
 
66 
 
for the address of the next node to be visited. In this case for sure, it is the home node and 
the MAS dispatches itself to its home as shown in  Figure 5-6. 
 
Figure 5-6:  Proposed Model at Trusted Server, after the Reach of the Nth Host 
5.5.5. At Home 
The MAS arrives back at home after completing its mission. The MAS contains a pair of 
encrypted information. The MAS hands the overall information to the ABA. For each pair 
of encrypted information retrieved from each host, the ABA does the following as in figure 
5-7: 
 First, using its private key (HPrvK) to decrypt the encrypted symmetric key, 
HPubK (SymK_i).  
 Second, using the decrypted symmetric key, SymK_i, it decrypts the information 
which is encrypted using the same key, SymK_i (Info_i).  
 The ABA does the same process for each pair of information retrieved from every 
host the agent goes to collect information. At last, the ABA displays the result to 
the user, Info_i.  
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Figure 5-7:  Security Model Back at Home. 
 
5.5.6. Security Model Summary for N Hosts 
You can find below a summary for the security model:  
 N hosts addresses digitally signed by the home node.  
 One ASE created at TS. 
 N symmetric random keys generated at each host.  
 N information retrieved will be encrypted by the corresponding N symmetric 
keys.  
 The N symmetric keys will be encrypted by the public key (RSA) of the home.  
 The encrypted N information and encrypted keys stored at the ASE.  
 Decryption at home node and displaying the plain text result to the user.  
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Evaluation of the Approach 
This section will deal with the malicious threats (presented in Chapter 3), using the various 
functionality of the countermeasure, presented above and how this is done. 
The work will focus on two types of threats: Alteration and Eavesdropping 
Alteration 
The countermeasure addresses alteration of carried threats from malicious hosts.  Unlike 
the previous mobile computation model, the mobile agent does not carry the result it has 
gathered from the previous hosts while visiting the next host. It gives no chance to a 
malicious host, interested to hack into the information provided by other competing hosts. 
Furthermore, the security model through usage of randomly generated symmetric keys 
protects the confidentiality of the information retrieved while the information is being sent 
to the TS for temporary storage. 
The countermeasure through separation of the destination part from the composition of 
the mobile agent also provides protection of alteration of the destination object. Based on 
the proposed approach, the user of the mobile agent creates a destination object, which 
consists of the list of all hosts to be visited in the agent space as well as the home and TS 
addresses; then the user digitally signs this object using its private key. This makes it a 
difficult task for a malicious host, which would like to misdirect the mobile agent by 
supplying a wrong destination object, as it cannot counterfeit the digitally signed 
destination objects. Any attempt on replacing the destination object while the mobile agent 
is in the way of the agent space will be detected by the mobile agent itself, as it always 
checks the validity of the destination object it carries, on its arrival at each and every host, 
before using it to select the next host to be visited. 
 
Eavesdropping 
The countermeasure addresses the threat of eavesdropping of the collected information, 
using the security model to randomly generate a symmetric key that will be used to 
encrypt the collected information. The sending of information in encrypted form protects 
external malicious eavesdropper from learning anything substantial while the information 
is sent for temporary storage. The computing model also protects internal eavesdropping 
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to be an impossible task. A malicious host which would like to look into the information 
collected so far, simply cannot do so, due to the adapted new computing model, as the 
information is not available there. 
The protection model against malicious hosts is developed using JAVA Code. It can be 
found in Appendix E. 
5.6. Conclusion  
This chapter has presented a new approach of protection against malicious hosts in mobile 
network world. This new approach is based on trusted servers. Its strength is that it relies 
on the existing protection solutions. The evaluation of this approach will be done, based 
on Eavesdropping and Alteration. Chapter 7 will show in detail, the results of this new 
approach. 
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 Chapter 6 : Experimental 
Work 
 
6.1. Introduction 
The previous chapters described, in details, the new approaches for detection of SYN 
flooding attacks using the sketch techniques, and the protection method against malicious 
hosts based on trusted servers. The robustness, performance and strength of these new 
proposed models of mobile agents: both protection and detection will be tested in this 
chapter. (Appendix C will delineate in detail the experiment environment.  
6.2. Protection Model Results 
This section presents the result of the implementation of the security policy as well as the 
result of the performance comparison between different types of mobile agents.  
    
6.2.1. Developed Classes 
To realize the proposed model in the Chapter 4, a number of classes are developed. Some 
of them form the basic components of the prototype: like statA, mobile and Agentapp, 
while other classes are developed to implement the Graphical User Interface (GUI). 
6.2.1.1. Destn 
This class encapsulates the addresses of the nodes to be visited by the mobile agent, 
including the addresses of its home and its trusted server. In this class, the separation of 
the other parts of the mobile agent from its list of destinations is implemented. The object 
of this class is constructed based on the user’s preference and order of list of hosts it wants 
the mobile agent to visit. The functions are listed in figure 6-1 
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Figure 6-1:  Functions of the Destn Class 
6.2.1.2. ProxyH 
This class holds the proxy of the main interacting parties of the countermeasure: Mobile 
Agent, ASE & Agent based application. As mentioned in Destn Class, Aglets encapsulates 
the information in a message, then uses the proxy of the other party to send the message 
object. By this action, the ProxyH serves as the container of the proxy of the main 
interacting components of the system. It provides a number of methods to keep its instance 
variables valid. 
 
In the current implementation of aglet, the proxy of a moving agent obtained while it is at 
one host becomes invalid as it moves from one host to another, and hence needs to be 
constantly updated as the mobile agent migrates. But the proxy of a stationary agent 
remains valid throughout its life time. The functions of this class are listed in figure 6.2. 
 
Figure 6-2: Functions of the ProxyH 
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6.2.1.3. CipherCls 
This class provides cryptographic services to the agent- based application and to the 
mobile agent using Legion of Bouncy Castle provider implemented algorithms. It 
provides various methods to sign object, verify a signed object, encrypt and decrypt. 
The functions of the class are listed in figure 6-3. 
 
Figure 6-3: Functions of the CipherCIs 
6.2.2. Components of the Prototype Application 
This section will describe in detail, how the components (AgentApp, mobileA, statA) are 
implemented, in order to execute the proposed protection approach.  
6.2.2.1. statA 
This class creates the temporary storage element (ASE) concept.  
A statA is created by each MA inside a trusted server on its first visit there. It is used to 
temporarily store results that the mobile agent retrieves from its different hosts in the 
agent space. The information in the statA is encrypted, so even it doesn’t know what it is 
storing about. 
Then, the statA transfers the results it has created, to the corresponding mobile agent at 
the end of the mobile agent’s missions on its way back to its home. After that, it disposes 
itself to handover the resources it has been using, back to the trusted servers. 
An example of the code can be found below in figure 6-4. 
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Figure 6-4: Class statA 
 The instance variable statRes stores temporarily, the information the agent 
sends, while visiting different nodes in the agent space.  
 statKeys instance variable holds a symmetric key that the mobile agent 
generates randomly, as the MA visits various hosts in the agent space. This key 
is used to protect both the confidentiality and integrity of the partial 
information as it is sent to the ASE.  
 The instance variable prxy is of type ProxyH as shown in figure 6-5. It holds the 
proxy of the three interacting parties in the model (the mobile agent, stationary 
agent and application agent) to facilitate the exchange of information among 
themselves. 
 
Figure 6-5: Class ProxyH 
onCreation(Object init) is a method that every agent that extends Aglet inherits and this 
method is called only once in the life cycle of the agent. 
Its role is described below: 
 It initializes instance variables of the agent. It also provides a mechanism to pass 
an array of objects containing important information from the creator of the 
agent, down to agent being created.  
 The MA that is responsible for the creation of the statA passes to it a ProxyH 
object, which contains important proxy information. In the code that follows, 
the statA updates its own proxy instance variable, holds  inside the proxy object, 
using the updateSProxy() method.  
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 getProxy() returns the proxy of the current aglet, i.e. the stationary agent. 
The next section of block of code is shown in  figure 6-6  given below: 
 
Figure 6-6   Code: handleMessage (Message msg)  
The above code shows the behaviour of the agent, as it receives various kinds of messages 
from the mobile agent.  
In mobile agents that implement aglet, every message that is sent to the aglet is handled 
inside handleMessage (Message msg).  
 The first if case is satisfied, if a message object of kind “MobileAway” is sent to 
the stationary agent. In the proposed model, such a kind of message object is 
sent by the mobile agent, while it is visiting different hosts in the agent space. 
This same message object encapsulates the information the agent retrieves from 
the corresponding hosts. The statA uses msg.getArg() method to retrieve this 
information ,which is a sealed object. This same information, as stated in the 
proposition, is stored in the statA temporarily, using statRes.add(sor) 
statement.  Similar techniques are used to retrieve the second argument sent by 
the mobile agent and stored in the corresponding temporary storage. 
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 The second if case will be satisfied, when the message object of kind 
“MobileBackV” is sent to the statA. In the proposed model, such a kind of 
message object is sent to the statA by the mobileA, when the MA has finished 
touring various hosts in the agent space and returns to collect all the 
information it has stored temporarily while it is on the move. The statA hands 
over all the information it has accumulated, by constructing a message object of 
kind “MobileH” encapsulating the pieces of information. 
6.2.2.2. MobileA 
This class is used to realize the actual mobile agent, which moves from one node to 
another,  to perform the computation.  
A detailed discussion of the code is shown below in figure 6-7. 
 
Figure 6-7 Class: MobileA 
This class by virtue of extending the base class (Aglet) and implementing mobilityListener, 
becomes an agent that can listen and react to mobility events (a mobile agent) as shown in 
below figure 6-8. 
 
Figure 6-8 Class: MobilityListener 
 The MA uses the instance variable startTrip while it is at the trusted server to 
take on appropriate action, depending on whether it is there first or after 
completing its mission. The instance variable prxy of ProxyH as in the statA is 
used to hold the proxy of agent that it wants to interact with, in this case the 
proxy of both the statA and the AgentApp.  
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 The instance variable agletName holds the name, specifically the class name, of 
the stationary agent that this mobile agent will create on the TS, as shown in   
figure 6-9 given below. 
 
 
Figure 6-9 Class: MobilityListener 
 As mentioned before, the onCreation(object init) method is called once the aglet, 
MobileA, is created. In the prototype, the MA is created by the agent application. It, 
the application, passes to the MA two objects, one that is a digitally signed destination 
object and the other, a ProxyH. 
 Each of these objects is passed as an array of objects and hence need to be retrieved 
using appropriate index and casted to appropriate type. Next, the MA un-signs the 
digitally signed destination object, using the utility class’s 
CipherCls.getSignedObject(). To un-sign the signed object, it needs the public key of 
the corresponding private key at its disposal. This public key is obtained using the 
utility class’s CipherCls.getPublickey(alias) method. The object retrieved, unsigned, 
is casted to Destn object and it is ready to be used.  
 goToNext() method is invoked to dispatch the MA to the next node in its list of 
destinations. Literally,  according to the proposition, it goes to the TS and doesn’t 
have any thing to do when it is created. 
  The line of code, in Figure 6-10, addMobilityListener permits this mobile agent to 
listen to mobility events and react according to the way ‘this’ is coded. 
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Figure 6-10 Code: onArrival(MobilityEvent 
The above code shows a section of code inside onArrival (MobilityEvent event) methods. 
This method is one of the three methods including onDispatching (MobilityEvent event) 
and onReverting(MobilityEvent event), that agents implementing mobility Listener 
interface needs to define. It is executed every time a mobile agent arrives at another node. 
In the proposed model, once the MA arrives to a node, a number of test conditions are 
utilized. 
The section below will describe when each of the test condition is satisfied and a range of 
tasks that will be performed. 
 The first if case if (dstn.isAtTS (this)) tests whether the mobile agent is currently at its 
TS home or not. This condition is tested using isAtTS(this) method of Destn class. The 
method compares the URL of the current mobile agent using the argument this with 
the URL of the TS it holds inside. The condition will be satisfied if the mobile agent is 
at the TS. But as per the proposition, the mobile agent could be  there at two different 
instances, ie. at the first and  the last.  
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In each case, it performs various kinds of tasks. The if’s inside uses the variable 
startTrip to determine whether the mobile agent is there at first with a set startTrip 
value, or at the end of its mission with a reset startTrip value. 
If the agent is there at first, it performs the following range of tasks: 
 Gets the context of the platform it is running at, using the getAgletContext() 
method of Aglet; 
 Creates its temporary data storage (ASE) inside the trusted server, using 
AgletContext’s create aglet method; 
 Passes all the necessary information  the method needs through(code-based, 
class name of the agent and others),  its arguments to the agent being created 
using object init argument. 
 Updates instance variables corresponding to the proxy of the stationary agent, 
using the proxy of the stationary object just returned, and 
 Uses the dstn go to next  method to select the next node next to it. 
If the agent is at TS after completing its task, it performs a range of tasks as pointed out 
below: 
 The mobile agent constructs a message object of “MobileBackV”, mimicking the fact 
that it is back at TS; 
 Sends the constructed message object, using the proxy of the stationary agent it 
retrieved from the proxy instance variable‘s getSProxy(); 
 The stationary agent when receives message of such type will send all 
information it has stored; 
 The information is sent as a message object by the stationary object and stored 
in a similar message object instance variable; 
 The mobile agent invokes the method dstn.goBackHome () to return home ; 
‘MISSION ACCOMPLISHED’.  
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The next if else is shown in below figure 6-11. 
 
Figure 6-11 Code: if else for the dstathome 
When the condition is satisfied it performs the following tasks: 
 Hands over all the result is has collected from the visited hosts, back to the user (agent 
based application), by retrieving its proxy from the proxy object; 
 Disposes of itself, as it is no longer needed. 
The last if case will be run when either of the above conditions is not met ; this means that 
the agent is neither at home nor at TS; it is doing its job at some other context, touring the 
different hosts for the information.  
 
The major tasks performed are shown in the code fragment given below in Figure 6-12. 
 
Figure 6-12 Code: Touring the Different Hosts 
The agent executes the security model developed to protect parts of the mobile agent, 
while the agent is touring the potentially malicious hosts in the agent space. There, it 
performs the following range of tasks: 
 It retrieves the public key of the Agentapp using the utility method’s             
CipherCls.getPublicKey(); 
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 Generates a random symmetric key using generateSecret () method of CipherCls; 
 Next; the symmetric key generated is sealed(encrypted), using sealSecetKey() 
method of the CipherCls object; 
 Does its job; 
 Encrypts the data it obtained, using sealobject() method of CipherCls class; 
 Constructs a message object that will be sent to the stationary agent that 
encapsulates both the retrieved object and the sealed symmetric key; and 
 Moves on  either to a next host or back to TS,  depending on whether it’s at the 
middle of its journey or at the end of its host visit mission. 
6.2.2.3. AgentApp 
This class creates the agent based application located at the home computer. It is used by 
the user to create and dispatch a mobile agent that acts on its behalf to perform a range of 
tasks on the hosts’ list provided. This class constitutes a number of other classes that 
collects input information from the user, about the mobile agent to be dispatched through 
GUI’s. 
6.2.2.4. pathDIg 
This class implements a dialog box that lets users to enter the address of the list of hosts 
the mobile agent is going to visit. It allows the users to enter the address of the TS , as 
shown in   figure 6-13 given below. 
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Figure 6-13:  Path Dig box 
6.2.2.5. MobileUIF 
This class is the GUI; it is the face of the application. 
6.2.2.6. infoDIg 
This class shows the information retrieved by the agent as shown  below in figure 6-14. 
 
Figure 6-14: Dial Box 
Retracing the steps to describe the major parts of the main class, AgentApp, is shown in 
the below figure 6-15. 
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Figure 6-15 Class: AgentApp 
The above code describes the class declaration of the AgentApp. It extends Aglet as in the 
case of mobileA and statA, implying that it is an agent too. This is only done to exploit the 
famous information exchange mechanism supported by aglet’s platform: the message 
object. The declaration shows that the class implements the interface ActionListener, so 
that it can listen and react to events as the user interacts with the GUI components of the 
user interface as shown below in figure 6-16.  
 
Figure 6-16 Code: Main Variables for AgentApp Class 
The code above shows the most important instance variables of the AgentApp class.  
 mobui is an instance of mobileUIF class and is used to show up the main GUI 
as the agent based application runs.  
 The instance variables of JMenuItem, crtMenuI, DispaMenuI, setinMenuI, are 
used to get a reference to some of the most important menu items inside the 
mobieUIF class. The AgentApp is using these instance variables codes, how 
each should behave as the user interacts with the corresponding menu items.  
 Abahsts and abavhms instance variables are of ArrayList types and holds the 
list of hosts and TS the mobile agent visits respectively. 
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 Instance variables ArrayList clrKeys and ArrayList clrInfos are used to hold the 
unscrambled keys and results respectively, to show it up to the user.  
 Instance variables SignedObject dsDstn and Destn dstn hold the digitally 
signed and the unsigned destination object respectively.  
 The instance variable AgletName = "mobileA" holds the class name of the 
mobile agent that is going to be dispatched by the AgentApp.  
 The next three instance variables are used to access and store cryptographic 
keys from the keystore as described as follows. Password="virtual" holds the 
password of the whole of the keystore. alias="kprvirtual" holds a ‘name or alias’ 
that differentiates the public key of the application with the other public keys 
available in the keystore and finally, PrivateKey prvk holds the private key to be 
retrieved from the key store and will be stored in the prvk instance variable. 
The last instance variables of type long are used to capture performance 
parameter of the mobile agent as shown in figure 6-17 given below. 
 
Figure 6-17 Code: onCreation Method 
 
The above code describes the major actions undertaken as the agent based application’s 
onCreation() method is called as.  
The last line of code, as shown in figure 6-18, mobui. show ( ), brings up the main GUI or 
face of the application. 
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Figure 6-18 Code: Behaviour of the Application 
The above code defines the behaviour of the application as it interacts with other agents. 
The first line of code records the time the agent returns home, to compute a performance 
parameter. Next, the private key of the agent application is retrieved to unscramble the 
information that the mobile agent will be delivering to the AgentApp shortly. The mobile 
agent passes the information it has collected from the hosts in the agent space using the 
message object to Iterator for easy traversal. The while loop using the iterator object 
traverses the scrambled information handed over, to unscramble and store it in a plain 
form to the instance variables clrKeys and clrInfos. The utility class’s CipherCls method 
unsealSecretKey()and unsealSealedObject() plays a crucial role in the process. At last the 
information is passed to infoDlg dialog box to be displayed to the user. 
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6.2.3. Setting up the laboratory 
A specific set up is made in order to initiate the mobile agent network. 
Computer A is considered to act as trusted server (TS) and computer B runs many host 
nodes simulated through various port numbers as well as the home node in a virtualized 
mode as shown in figure 6-19.  
Wireshark Network Packet Analyser will be running regularly over computer A. its job is 
to capture, sniff packets in a network and store them.  
Comp A
Trusted Server 20.0.0.1
Comp B
Home 20.0.0.2:4434
Host#1 20.0.0.2:8001
Host#2 20.0.0.2:8002
Host#3 20.0.0.2:8003
Host#4 20.0.0.2:8004
.
.
.
.
Host#20 20.0.0.2:8020
CISCO 2960 24 Ports
  
Figure 6-19 : Test Environment Set Up 
The setup is amply described in Appendix B. 
Several types of Mobile Agents (Proposed MA, DS MA and Normal MA) are generated as 
described below:  
 Normal Mobile Agent (Normal MA):  An Agent that executes mobile computation 
in the usual way. 
 Proposed Mobile Agent (Proposed MA): A Mobile Agent which is directed by the 
security model  mentioned in section 4. 
 Digitally Signed Mobile Agent (DSMA): A Mobile Agent that supports digital 
signing of the destination object while still performing computation.  
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6.2.4. Evaluation Strategy  
This section will measure the capability of the model towards eavesdropping and 
alteration threats between several types of Mobile Agents (Proposed MA, DS MA and 
Normal MA). 
6.2.4.1. Eavesdropping 
 Figure 6-20 shows analysis of the packet captured while the Normal MA and DS MA are 
in execution.  
As it is shown in either cases (DS MA and Normal MA), it is possible to eavesdrop what 
information is retrieved and exchanged at each host: “OS Architecture: x86; OS Version: 
5.2”. 
 
Figure 6-20:  Captured Packet Analysis for DS MA and Normal MA 
Figure 6-21 shows the analysis of the captured packet while the Proposed MA is in 
operation. As it can be seen from the figure, unlike the above case, it is not possible to look 
into its content since the information is sent to the TS in encrypted form. 
 
 
Figure 6-21: Captured Packet Analysis for Proposed MA 
Hence, the security model provides the required confidentiality of the information while 
it is being stored at ASE.  
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6.2.4.2. Alteration 
To test the strength of the proposed approach against alteration, a malicious host is 
included. 
A malicious node is interfering on a different port number in the Computer B. This node 
is planned to behave maliciously towards the Proposed MA; its goal is to supply a wrong 
public key to the MA as it arrives there and is in the process of un-signing its digitally 
signed destination object. But fortunately,  the MA cannot un-sign the signed object using 
the public key just supplied. This is because the destination object is signed by the private 
key of the home node, not by a private key which corresponds to the public key supplied 
by the hostile node. Therefore, any attempt of alteration of destination object will be 
detected by the MA as shown in figure 6-22. 
 
 
Figure 6-22:  Detection of Malicious Host 
6.2.4.3. Performance Comparison:  
To measure the performance of every mobile agent (Normal, DS, Proposed MA), a similar 
test environment, as above is used. Their performance is compared in terms of their 
average turnaround time, measured in milliseconds (ms).  
This performance parameter is the average time in milliseconds (ms) each Mobile Agent 
requires to do the job, after being dispatched,  till it returns and handovers the result to 
the user.  
 
CHAPTER 6 : EXPERIMENTAL WORK 
88 
 
As expected DS Mobile Agent takes in between of the two. Comparing the execution time 
of the Normal MA with the Proposed MA, the latter needs approximately 5x more time as 
shown in Figure 6-23.  
 
This substantial amount of time is the price to pay to achieve the corresponding security: 
Generation of the keys, encryption of partial information, verification of destination object 
at each visited host and at last collecting the results back to the Mobile Agent from the TS 
all add up to form a big turnaround time.  
 
 
Figure 6-23: Performance Comparison between Different Types of Mobile Agents 
Comparing the performance time between DS MA and Proposed MA, the DS MA 
apparently needs less time. This is due to the fact that DS MA does not carry out some of 
the functions the Proposed MA performs like Generation of keys and Encryption. It 
takes time since it verifies that the destination object is a valid copy on its arrival at each 
and every host.  
 
Figure 6-24 compares the execution time for all Mobile Agent cases. As the number of 
nodes to be visited is steadily increased, it can be noticed that the turnaround time 
increases. This is a tribute to the fact that there are more jobs to be done. 
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Figure 6-24:  Performance Time Trend as the Number of Nodes Visited Increases 
6.3. Detection Model Test Results 
This section presents the performance analysis results for integrating divergence measures 
over Sketch, for detecting SYN flooding attacks in a mobile agent network.  A mobile agent 
network is going to be implemented. Hence, the comparison of three divergence measures 
(HD, PD & χ2) over Sketch for the detection of flooding attacks will be tested. 
For the sake of simplicity, the analysis on the detection of SYN flooding attacks is focused, 
as it is the widely used attack for DDoS in these days.  
6.3.1. Experiments Set Up  
The above described mobile agents will have to execute the similar path. To measure the 
capability of the model towards eavesdropping threat, a test environment is set up using 
the above mentioned computers as shown in Figure 6-19. Computer A is considered to act 
as trusted server (TS) and computer B runs many host nodes simulated through various 
port numbers as well as the home node in a virtualized mode. Appendix B presents the 
tools used to assure the set up. 
 
Ethereal will be running regularly over computer A. Its job is to collect packets in the 
mobile agent network and store them for a period of 4h00 from 18/02/2017 07h30 to 
11h30. These traces are used to test the efficiency of divergence measures. IP addresses in 
the traces are scrambled by a modified version of tcpdriv tool, but correlation between 
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addresses are conserved. These 4h traces using Sketch data structure are analysed using a 
key of the Sketch (κn = DIP), and a reward vn = 1 for SYN request only, and vn = 0 
otherwise. The Sketch is set with a width K to 1024, and the number of hash H  with a 
value of 5. 
For simplicity, 12 real distributed SYN flooding attacks with different intensity inside this 
trace are injected. These attacks are inserted each 30 minutes (on instants t=30, 61, 90, 
127,157,187, etc.)  span for 10 minutes. These different intensity attacks are shown in Figure 
6-25. The first attack begins with a value of 700 SYN/min and decreases until 80 SYN/min. 
 
Figure 6-25:  SYN Flooding Attacks 
6.3.2. Evaluation Strategy  
This section evaluates the performance of the proposed detection scheme.  
6.3.2.1. Detection Techniques 
Below are the techniques to detect the anomaly in mobile agent networks. They rely on 
the techniques described in Chapter 4. 
- Sketch technique 
- Dynamic Threshold 
- Divergence Measures 
- Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) 
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A focus on tuning the parameter of Divergence Measures to optimize the performance is 
applied. The performance analysis over available IP traces, in Mobile Agent Network 
integrated with flooding attacks, is conducted.  An evaluation of the performance of the 
proposed divergence measure via the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) is 
conducted. 
6.3.2.1.1. Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Technique 
To evaluate the performance of Power Divergence with different value of 𝛽, an 
investigatation between the False Positive Rate (FPR) and True Positive rate (TPR), which 
is the Detection Rate (DR), is performed. A confusion matrix and ROC will be used to 
evaluate the detection. Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) is used for accuracy 
analysis when varying the value of the threshold h. ROC curve shows the variation of the 
true positive rate (Eq. 16) in term of false positive rate (Eq. 17): 
𝐷𝑅 = 𝑇𝑃𝑅 =
TP
TP + FN
    𝑋    100   (16) 
The false positive rate is defined as the ratio of false alarms to the number of raised alarms: 
𝐹𝑃𝑅 =
FP
TP + FP
    𝑋    100               (17) 
where,  
 True positives (TP):   refer to the positive tuples that were correctly labelled by the 
classifier; an alarm is triggered because there is anomaly in the network. 
 True negatives (TN):  are the negative tuples that were correctly labelled by the 
classifier; an alarm is triggered but there is no anomaly in the network. 
 False positives (FP):  are the negative tuples that were incorrectly labelled as 
positive; an alarm is not be triggered when there is anomaly in the network. 
 False negatives (FN): These are the positive tuples that were mislabeled as 
negative; an alarm is not be triggered since there is not any anomaly in the 
network. 
6.3.2.1.2. Dynamic Threshold 
Instead of using a static threshold, the Exponential Weighted Moving Average (EWMA), 
defined in the equations (3, 4, 5 &6) in Chapter 4, is used. 
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The parameters α, λ and μ are all tunable parameters in the mode.  
After several experiments on real attacks, numerous trial & errors  are conducted. This is 
to find the best parameter of the threshold to improve the detection accuracy as mentioned 
in below table 6-1. 
Table 6-1 Threshold Parameters 
Threshold Parameter 
α 0.125 
𝛽 0.25 
λ 5 
μ 1 
6.3.2.1.3. Divergence Measures and Sketch Technique 
The detection scheme will rely on the sketch technique and three types of divergences 
measures: Hellinger Distance, Chi-Square, and Power Divergence as described in Chapter 
4. 
6.3.2.2. Injection of SYN Flooding Attacks 
Figure 6-26 & Figure 6-27 show the variation of total number of mobile agents’ packets 
before and after the injection of SYN flooding attacks.  
By comparing these variations, the differences between both figures without deep 
inspection might not be noticed. Inserted attacks do not induce heavy deviations in the 
time series of the total number of SYN requests. This can be explained by the fact that the 
intensity of SYN flooding attacks is not large compared to the intensity of the total number 
of SYN segments. In such cases, the detection of attacks is very challenging, because no 
heavy changes in the time series describing the variations of the total number of SYN, and 
the intensity of the SYN flooding attacks  is buried by the large number of SYN (as shown 
in Figure 6-25) before attacks injection. 
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Figure 6-26 : Total Number of Mobile Agents’ Packets 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-27 Total Number of Mobile Agents’ Packets after SYN Flooding Attacks Injection 
6.3.2.3. Comparison between HD & Chi-
square 
This section presents the evaluation results of the application by comparing Hellinger 
Distance & Chi-Square response on the mobile agent IP traces. 
 
First, the analysis begins by applying HD & 𝑥2 divergence over over the mobile agent IP 
traces (before injection SYN flooding attacks). The dynamic threshold, as given in 
Equation 6, is set.  
 
Figures 6-28 & 6-29 show the variation of these 2 divergence algorithms as well as the 
dynamic threshold before the injection of attacks. When the value of divergence measures 
is larger than the threshold in at least 3 hash tables in the Sketch, an alarm is triggered. It 
can see that both algorithms were able to detect anomalies at different times (t=90, 
127,157,180 etc.).  These anomalies are temporary and they do not persist for more than 
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many minutes. However, there are more anomalies that can be detected by using the 
source IP address as the key of the Sketch, but the analysis will be restricted to SYN 
flooding attacks. In fact, after the manual verification of traces, it is found that HD triggers 
4 false positive alarms, and the 𝑥2 divergence achieves very high detection accuracy with 
2 positive alarms. 
Indeed, the analyses are conducted by applying the HD and Chi-Square over the mobile 
agent IP traces (after injection SYN flooding attacks). It is noticed that in case of Hellinger 
Distance using a dynamic threshold, 4 false positive alarms with a detection of 100% are 
obtained (Figure 6-30).  However, in the case of Chi-Square, 2 false positive alarms with a 
detection of 100% are obtained (Figure 6-31).  
As conclusion, Chi-square divergence performs better than HD in terms of reducing false 
positive alarm, with less effort for tuning the dynamic threshold. In conclusion, Chi-
Square outperforms Hellinger Distance in terms of detection. 
 
 Figure 6-28: Hellinger Distance before attacks  
 
Figure 6-29 : Chi-square before attacks 
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Figure 6-30:  Hellinger Distance after attacks 
 
Figure 6-31: Chi-square After Attacks 
6.3.2.4. Power Divergence 
6.3.2.4.1. Comparison of PD Using Different Values of 𝛽 
This part will focus this study on the Power Divergence.  
Due to space limitation, the results for the following of values 𝛽 are tested 𝛽= 0.5, 1.5, 2 
and 2.2. 
This divergence presents some interesting special cases as discussed in Chapter 4.  
For 𝛽 = 0.5, this divergence is 4 x  𝐻𝐷 (𝑃 || 𝑄), and for 𝛽 = 2 it is equal to 0.5 *  𝑥2  (𝑃 || 𝑄) 
divergence. Obviously, this power divergence then outperforms the 𝑥2 and HD measures. 
This will be tested and proved in this section. 
 
The value of 𝛽 = 0.5 makes the Power Divergence (PD) proportional to Hellinger Distance 
(HD). Figure 6-32 shows the variation of Power Divergence for 𝛽 = 0.5 with the dynamic 
threshold given in Equation 6. Power Divergence is able to detect all the SYN flooding 
attacks but with 4 false alarms.  
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For the value of 𝛽= 1.5, Figure 6-33 shows the variation of Power. It is  noticed that via this 
value of 𝛽, all the attacks have been detected (100%) with only 3 false positive alarm. The 
intensity of spike is proportional to the intensity of the attack.  
 
For the value of 𝛽= 2, Figure 6-34 shows the variation of Power. It can be noticed that via 
this value of 𝛽, all the attacks have been detected (100%) with only 2 false positive alarms.  
 
For the value of 𝛽= 2.2, Figure 6-35 shows the variation of Power. It can be noticed that via 
this value of 𝛽, all the attacks have been detected (100%) with only false positive alarm.  
 
 
Figure 6-32:  Power Divergence for 𝛽=0.5 
 
Figure 6-33:  Power Divergence for 𝛽= 1.5 
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Figure 6-34:  Power Divergence for 𝛽= 2 
 
Figure 6-35:  Power Divergence for 𝛽= 2.2 
Table 6-2 presents a summary of the result of detections: 
Table 6-2:  False Positive Alarm for Different Values of β 
Different Values 
of β of PD 
False Positive Alarm Notes 
0.5 4 For β=0.5, PD=4 * HD 
1.5 3   
2 2 For β=2, PD=0.5 * 𝑥2 
2.2 1   
 
Based, on the above experiments, it can be concluded that the value of 𝛽= 2.2 outperforms 
the values of 𝛽 = 0.5, 1.5, and 2 in terms of true detection and false positive rate.  
By this action, Power Divergence outperforms Hellinger Distance and Chi-Square. 
Moreover, the best value of 𝛽 for limiting the false positive alarm is 2.2. 
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6.3.2.4.2. Flooding Rate Comparison 
The experiments are repeated for several times on Hellinger Distance, Chi-square and PD 
β=2.2 and change the attack rates accordingly. This specific value of β is chosen for PD 
since, as shown previously, it presents better detection with low false positive alarm rate. 
Even when the attack rate is as low as 70 per mn, Chi-Square can still identify it with the 
accuracy of 80%, where HD accuracy is 60%. Moreover, PD with β=2.2 presents an 
accuracy of 98.1% as shown in Table 6-3. 
Table 6-3:  Flooding Rate Result  
Flooding Rate 
Number of 
Experiments 
Detection 
Probability PD 
with β=2.2 
Detection 
Probability of Chi-
Square 
Detection 
Probability of 
HD 
70 40 98.1% 80% 60% 
80 40 100% 100% 100% 
120 40 100% 100% 100% 
480 40 100% 100% 100% 
700 40 100% 100% 100% 
 
The intensity of raised spikes in PD increases with the intensity of attacks and the dynamic 
threshold becomes useless.  
As conclusion, PD β=2.2 represents better detection accuracy (of a value of 98.1%) in 
comparison with Hellinger Distance and Chi-Square in terms of low intensity level of 
attack rate. 
6.3.2.4.3. Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Result 
To evaluate the performance of Divergence Measures (PD, Chi-Square & PD), an 
investigation between the true positive rate and the false positive rate is conducted. 
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) is used for accuracy analysis when varying the 
value of the threshold h; A high true positive and a low false alarm rate are desired to 
achieve good performance.  
The performance of the three divergence measures over Sketch: 𝑥2, HD and PD with β=2.2 
are compared. As mentioned previously, only this specific value of β is chosen, since this 
value presents better detection of false positive alarm rate.   
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Figure 6-35 given below shows that the ROC curves (TPR versus FPR) when varying the 
parameters in the threshold.   
With the use of dynamic threshold, and the Halt technique of forecasting after the 
detection of attack, HD achieves a TPR=100% with a FPR of 43%, 𝑥2 achieves a TPR=100% 
with FPR=20%, and PD (β=2.2) achieves a TPR=100% with FPR=3.8%.  
Thus, when comparing the performance of these algorithms, it is found that PD achieves 
better than HD and Chi-square. PD outperforms both measures for anomaly detection 
with the lowest FPR.  In conclusion, PD leads to very attractive performance in terms of 
True Positive Rate and False Positive Rate. 
 
Figure 6-36:  Receiver Operating Characteristic for 𝑥2, HD and PD 
     Table 6-4 summarizes the result of ROC based on different values of β: 
Table 6-4 : ROC Based on Divergence Measures 
Divergence Measures False Positive Alarm True Positive Alarm 
HD 43% 100% 
Chi-Square 20% 100% 
PD for β=2.2 3.8% 100% 
 
As per the results of the performed experiences, the best detection (100%) of anomaly with 
a reduced false alarm ratio (3.8%) is Power Divergence with a value of β=2.2. Its confusion 
table is provided in Table 6-5 given below. 
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Table 6-5:  Confusion Table for PD of β=2.2 
PD with β=2.2 Predicted: No Predicted: Yes 
Actual: NO 96.20% 3.80% 
Actual: yes 2.90% 98.10% 
6.4. Conclusion 
The main goal of this chapter is to test the strength of both the proposed approaches for 
the protection and detection of attacks in a mobile agent platform. 
 
The protection approach has evaluated how different types of mobile agents reacts, based 
on real traces with attacks. The experimental results have shown that the proposed 
security approach provides the required confidentiality of the information while it is being 
stored at ASE, where it is not possible to look into its content as information is forwarded 
to the TS in an encrypted form. Additional test has shown that this security approach is 
capable of protecting against alteration attacks.  
Then a measure of the performance of the proposed approach is performed. The results 
indicate that this new model for mobile agent needs approximately four times more than 
a normal agent to execute its job. This is caused due to the Generation of the keys, 
encryption of partial information, verification of destination object at each visited host and 
finally collecting the results back to the Mobile Agent from the TS all this add up to form 
a big turnaround time. Moreover, a comparison with the execution time for all Mobile 
Agent cases was carried out as the number of nodes to be visited is increased it was noticed 
that the turnaround time also increased. This is a tribute to the fact that there are more jobs 
to be done. 
In conclusion, the proposed approach is capable of providing the confidentiality of the 
mobile agent in addition to being able to protect against eavesdropping and alteration 
attacks.  
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Flooding attack is very severe in mobile agent networks.  A flooding detection scheme is 
proposed by integrating the following techniques: Sketch and three kinds of Divergence 
Measures viz: Hellinger Distance, Chi-Square and Power Divergence.    
Sketch is used to build fixed-size compact summaries of the mobile agents’ flows. 
Divergence Measures (HD, PD for β=2.2,𝑥2) will profile normal traffic behaviours and 
detect attacks based on probability distributions defined from the sketch tables.   
The goal of the flooding detection scheme is to find the best way to limit the high false 
alarm ratio and the capability of detecting low intensity attacks in mobile agents’ network. 
Simulation results demonstrates the performance of the proposed technique. A focus on 
tuning the parameter of Divergence Measures is performed to optimize the performance. 
The three Divergence Measures (HD, PD for β=2.2,𝑥2) are compared. 
As per the experiments, Chi-square divergence performs better than HD in terms of 
reducing false positive alarm, with less effort for tuning the dynamic threshold.  
Then the simulation is continued by introducing Power Divergence with different values 
of 𝛽= 0.5, 1.5, 2 and 2.2. This divergence presents some interesting special cases as 
discussed in Chapter 4.   
For 𝛽 = 0.5, this divergence is 4 x  𝐻𝐷 (𝑃 || 𝑄), and for 𝛽 = 2 it is equal to 0.5 x  𝑥2  (𝑃 || 𝑄) 
divergence. Obviously, this power divergence then outperforms the 𝑥2 and HD measures.  
Based on the performed experiments, the value of 𝛽= 2.2 outperforms the values of 𝛽 = 
0.5, 1.5 and 2 in terms of false positive rate.  
In conclusion, Power Divergence outperforms Hellinger Distance and Chi-Square. The 
best value of 𝛽 for low false positive alarm is 2.2 where only one false positive alarm is 
detected. 
 
Further test is performed to know which Divergence Measure (HD, PD for β=2.2,𝑥2) is 
capable of detecting the low intensity attacks by changing the attack rates accordingly.  
Even if the attack rate is as low as 70 per mn, Chi-Square can still identify it with the 
accuracy of 80%where HD accuracy is 60%. Moreover, PD with β=2.2 presents an accuracy 
of 98.1%.  
To conclude, PD β=2.2 represents better detection accuracy  in comparison with Hellinger 
Distance and Chi-Square in terms of low intensity attack. 
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In short, the performance of Divergence Measures (PD, Chi-Square & PD for β=2.2) has 
been evaluated by investigating between the true positive rate and the false positive rate. 
Thus, when comparing the performance of these algorithms, all Divergence Measures 
present a TPR of 100 % but PD of β=2.2 presents the lowest FPR of 3.8%. 
PD outperforms both measures (HD and 𝑥2) for anomaly detection with the lowest FPR.   
 
To conclude, it can be discerned that the work has achieved in outperforming the existing 
detection solutions by tuning the Power Divergence with β=2.2. With this value of β, the 
proposed detection scheme is leading to a very attractive performance in terms of True 
Positive Rate (100%), limiting the False Positive Rate (3.8%) and is capable of detecting low 
intensity attacks. 
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 Chapter 7: Conclusion and 
Further Work 
 
7.1. Conclusion  
This work presents and analyses a new model of protection (protection and detection) 
against threats, that can be used for the evaluation and analysis of the performance of the 
MA paradigm, in comparison to the CS models. 
MAs are simply put, just tools; but in actuality, they can be more. If they are uploaded 
with simple and suitable methods for different tasks, they can become highly skilled 
agents. This work tries to postulate that the Sketch techniques and Divergence measures 
integrated with Mobile Agent technology can effectively be combined to detect flooding 
attacks in communication networks. Indeed, the integration of mobile agents, with trusted 
server can protect the network against malicious attacks; it can easily facilitate the trip of 
mobile agents safely in the network.   
The MAs are deployed using Aglet from IBM platform and the cryptographic 
functionality into the system, so as to provide crypto services; these are implemented 
using the freely available Java cryptography service provider called “BC provider. 
 
The new proposed approach for protection against malicious hosts introduces the concept 
of setting up an active storage element in the agent space, as called “home away from 
home”, for partial result storage and separation as well as digital signing of the destination 
of the mobile agent.  
This approach clearly addresses the alteration and eavesdropping issues. The issue of 
alteration of carried result through encryption of partial results which are collected from 
the visited hosts and are sent to the TS. This protects the malicious host from altering the 
carried information. Furthermore, the integrity and the confidentiality of the information, 
while it is sent to the trusted server and stored there, is achieved. The separation of the 
destinations form the other parts of the mobile agent helps the home to digitally sign the 
list of hosts it wants to visit. In addition, the mobile agent on each destination could verify 
whether its signed object is tampered with or not, before putting that object into use. This 
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mechanism gives a malicious host no chance to alter the list of host addresses the mobile 
agent has carried and is going to visit. 
 
The work also addresses the threats of Eavesdropping of collected information, both from 
the internal and external malicious host perspective, through partially storing the 
encrypted information at the TS. 
 
Moreover, the performance of this approach has been tested. The  experimental results 
show that the new model of the mobile agent needs approximately 4x more time than a 
normal agent to execute its job. This is cause of the Generation of the keys, encryption of 
partial information, verification of destination object at each visited host and at last 
collecting the results back to the Mobile Agent from the TS all add up to form a big 
turnaround time. The execution time for all the Mobile Agent cases has definitely been 
compared; it is noticed that as the number of nodes to be visited is measured, the 
turnaround time increases. This is an indicator and a tribute to the fact that  more jobs can 
be and need to be done in this respect. 
 
The new proposed approach for detection of SYN flooding attacks is based on Sketch and 
Divergence Measures for anomaly detection on a mobile agent’s network. The proposed 
approach evaluated on SYN flooding attacks. Performances were compared in terms of 
true positive and false alarm ratio, over mobile agents IP traces with injected real 
distributed SYN flooding attacks at known instants.  
 
The accuracy of 3 divergence measures (HD, Power Divergence &Chi-square Divergence) 
over Sketch data structure has been analysed. Afterwards, dynamic threshold is used for 
achieving the best tradeoff between false alarm and true detection. It was found that HD 
performs a good detection, but with higher false alarm ratio than Chi-square divergence. 
Hence, it can be concluded that that Chi-square conducts better detection than HD for 
mobile agents’ network. Furthermore, it is found that the intensity of triggered spikes by 
Chi-square divergence increases significantly with the intensity of attacks. It is important 
to note that these divergence measures with Sketch are computationally efficient for 
handling traffic on mobile agents’ traffic. 
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It is shown that Power Divergence presents some interesting special cases. For 𝛽 = 0.5, this 
divergence is 4 x HD (P || Q), and for 𝛽 = 2 it is equal to 0.5 x  𝑥2 (P || Q) divergence. 
Obviously, this power divergence outperforms then the 𝑥2 and HD measures. In fact, by 
changing the values of𝛽, one can optimize the detection of attacks compared to the 𝑥2 and 
HD measures.  For PD, different values of 𝛽= 0.5, 1.5, 2&2.2 are proposed and studied. 
Results have shown that for 𝛽 = 2.2, PD outperforms the HD and 𝑥2.  
 
 
Based on the performed experiments, it can be concluded that the value of 𝛽= 2.2 
outperforms the values of 𝛽 = 0.5, 1.5 and 2 in terms of false positive rate. Only 1 false 
positive rate for 𝛽 = 2.2 is detected. 
Moreover, experimental results show the capacity of PD in the detection of low intensity 
attacks. PD with β=2.2 presents a better detection accuracy of 98.1% than HD (60%) and 
𝑥2 (80%). 
 
Finally, when comparing the performance of these algorithms in terms of false positive 
alarm and true positive alarm, it is found that all Divergence Measures present a TPR of 
100 %, but PD presents the lowest FPR of 3.8%. it can be concluded that PD outperforms 
both measures (HD & 𝑥2 ) for anomaly detection with the lowest FPR.   
 
In conclusion, the work has achieved in outperforming the existing detection solutions by 
tuning the Power Divergence with β=2.2. With this value of β, the detection scheme is 
leading to very attractive performance in terms of True Positive Rate (100%), False Positive 
Rate (3.8%) and is capable of detecting low intensity attacks. 
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7.2. Future Work 
Through this work, several aspects of the design and development of the MA have been 
addressed. This work has also come across several points which require further 
investigation, for example: 
 
 The setup of the protection proposition could also be used in the future to  address 
the issue of denial of service (DOS) to some extent, with respect to mobile agent 
computation. To send the information back, the mobile agent has so far 
accumulated at its active storage element as last minute retaliation by the trusted 
server based on some kind of timing mechanism if the TS hasn’t heard about the 
MA for quite a large amount of time. 
 Include a mechanism in the protection approach to flag malicious hosts when 
detected so as to be avoided by successive agents. This would reduce latency. 
 
 For the detection of attacks in mobile agent network, a focus on providing 
additional information to pinpoint malicious flows will be considered, in order to 
trigger automatic reaction against ongoing attacks. It is also intended to provide a 
method for reducing the amount of monitoring data on high speed networks, and 
analysing the impact of sampling on the precision of this divergence measure need 
to be developed. 
 
 Develop an estimation freeze scheme that can protect the HD threshold estimation 
from being impacted by the attacks. A side benefit of the estimation freeze scheme 
is that the duration of attacks can be traced. 
 
 Aiming to develop a software based on these two approaches and implement it in 
real time monitoring system, for a network in an enterprise since the scenarios 
considered in this work can be related to any type of networks. 
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As a result of this work, the following papers have been presented at the conferences and 
published in the proceedings: 
 
C.1 Jean Tajer, Mo Adda, Benjamin Aziz (2017) "Comparison Between Divergence 
Measures for Anomaly Detection of Mobile Agents in IP Networks” at 
AIRCSSE - International Journal Wireless & Mobile Networks (IJWMN) 
C.2 Jean Tajer, Mo Adda, Benjamin Aziz (2017) “Detection of Flooding Attacks on 
Mobile Agents Using Sketch Technique and Divergence Measures” at 
International Journal of Engineering Sciences & Research Technology 
(IJESRT) 
C.3 Jean Tajer, Mo Adda, Benjamin Aziz (2017) "Flooding Attacks Detection of 
Mobile Agents in IP Networks” presented at 4th International Conference on 
Computer Networks & Communications 2017 (CCNET) 
C.4 Jean Tajer, Mo Adda, Benjamin Aziz (2017) "New Computing Model for 
Securing Mobile Agents in IP Networks” presented at 2nd International 
Conference on Internet of Things, Big Data and Security 2017 (IotBDS)  
APPENDIX B - EXPERIMENT ENVIRONMENT 
114 
 
 Appendix B – Experiment 
Environment  
 
 
This section describes the laboratory setup and the software used for the thesis. 
The hardware and software are listed below: 
 PC Router: 
A PC with two network interface cards are installed. The overall information is as follows: 
Processors                    : Intel (R) Pentium (R) 4 CPU 2.80GHZ 
Memory                  :  8 GB 
Network adapters       : Intel® PRO/100 VE Network Connection 
Routing protocol          : RIP 
OS                                   : Windows server 2003 
 
 PC (Virtualised) 
The experiment deployed one computer running on virtualised machine. The overall 
information about them is as follows: 
Processors    : Intel (R) Pentium (R) 4 CPU 2.80GHZ 
Memory     :  8 GB 
Network adapters  : Intel® PRO/100 VE Network Connection 
OS    : Windows XP & VMWARE 
 
 Switch : 
Cisco Systems Catalyst 2900 Series XL 24 Port Switch 24-Port 10 Base T / 100 Base 
X. 
Computer A is considered to act as trusted server (TS) and computer B runs many 
host nodes simulated through various port numbers as well as the home node in a 
virtualized mode 
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Comp A
Trusted Server 20.0.0.1
Comp B
Home 20.0.0.2:4434
Host#1 20.0.0.2:8001
Host#2 20.0.0.2:8002
Host#3 20.0.0.2:8003
Host#4 20.0.0.2:8004
.
.
.
.
Host#20 20.0.0.2:8020
CISCO 2960 24 Ports
  
Figure B-1 Test Environment Set Up 
 
 The software used in the experiments works are described below:  
1- Wireshark Network Packet Analyser will be running regularly over computer 
A. its job is to capture, sniff packets in a network and store them as shown in 
below Figure B-2 10 
Figure B-2 Wireshark 
2- Hyenae11 is a highly flexible platform independent network packet generator. 
It allows you to reproduce several MITM, DoS and DDoS attack scenarios. It 
                                                     
10 https://sourceforge.net/projects/hyenae/,2016 
11 https://sourceforge.net/projects/hyenae/,2016 
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can be used simultaneously on multiple PCs to follow a Distributed Denial of 
Service attack. As shown in below Figure B-3, to start the flooding only a few 
options are required, such as the Target URL and the socket number 
(https://sourceforge.net/projects/hyenae/) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B-3 Network Packet Generator 
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Appendix C - Aglets Installation 
and Configuration Instructions 
for Windows 
 
 
To setup and run aglets successfully one needs an Aglets Software Development Kit 
(ASDK). Installing the Aglet WorkBench also required the installation of JDK SDK1.1 or 
later which in this case was J2SDK1.4.2_09.  
Operating Systems considered for the installation guide are; 
 Windows XP Professional 
 Windows 20003 Professional 
Step1  
Download and install the following packages from the internet; 
 Aglets-2.0.2 
 J2SDK1.4.2_09  
Step2 
Setting up the AGLET_HOME and PATHS environment variables; 
The following sequence of the installation guides need to be done in the command prompt. 
 AGLET_HOME 
Set the AGLET_HOME variable to the directory in which you installed the Aglets. It 
should look as follows if it is at the root directory of C:\ ;  
C:\> set AGLET_HOME=C:\AWB\Aglets  
 
PATH variables are set to include the subdirectory of the Aglet WorkBench(now 
AGLET_HOME). It should look as follows; 
   
C:\> set PATH=%AGLET_HOME%\bin;%PATH%  
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Step3 
Setting up environmental variables for Aglet program compilation; (CLASSPATH, 
AGLET_PATH, AGLET_EXPORT_PATH) 
III.CLASSPATH 
The CLASSPATH variable locates the directory of the aglet library (‘lib’). Below is the 
command;   
C:\> set CLASSPATH=%AGLET_HOME%\lib;%CLASSPATH%  
  
AGLET_PATH 
No codebased aglets uses AGLET_PATH as a default path when Aglets API is created on 
the AgletContext class as an argument with codebase. Set it as follows; 
C:\> set AGLET_PATH=C:\aglets\public  
 
 AGLET_EXPORT_PATH 
The AGLET_EXPORT_PATH variable locates files remotely for retrieval 
and referencing purposes. It can be set as follows; 
 
C:\> set AGLET_EXPORT_PATH=%AGLET_PATH%  
 
After this installation procedure, install JAVA_HOME before TAHITI server installation. 
Set as follows; 
 
  C:\>set JAVA_HOME=C:\J2sdk1.4.2_09 
 
Installing Tahiti Server: 
The following instructions need to be done at the command prompt: 
 
Go to the bin directory of aglets (C:\>Aglets\bin) at the command prompt. 
APPENDIX C – AGLETS INSTALLATION AND CONFIGURATION INSTRUCTION FOR WINDOWS 
119 
 
Type ant 
Right after that run ant install-home 
Typing agletsd –port 4434 at the ‘C:\>Aglets\bin’ prompt brings up the Tahiti server as 
shown below; 
 
 
 
The default port for this server is 4434.
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 Appendix D – Installation 
Providers in Aglet 
 
 
 
INSTALLING PROVIDERS 
Installing a provider is done in two steps: Installing the provider package classes and 
configuring the provider. 
 
Installing the Provider Classes: 
First make sure that the provider classes available so that they can be found when 
requested. 
Provider classes are shipped as a JAR (Java ARchive) file. 
 
To install the provider classes, install the JAR file containing the provider classes as an 
“installed” or “bundled” extension. 
 
The provider JAR-file will be considered as an installed extension if it is placed in the 
standard place for the JAR files of an installed extension: 
 
<java-home>/lib/ext 
 
Where <java-home> refers to the directory where the runtime software is installed, 
which is the top level directory of the Java 2 Runtime Environment (JRE) or the jre 
directory in the Java 2 SDK (Java 2 SDK) software. 
 
Configuring the Provider: 
The next step is to add the provider to a list of approved providers. This is done 
statically by editing the security properties file: 
<java-home>\lib\security\java. Security 
 
For each provider, this file should have a statement of the following form: 
security.provider.n=masterClassName 
This declares a provider and specifies its preference order n. The preference order is 
the order in which providers are searched for requested algorithms when no specific 
provider is requested. 
The order is 1-based; 1 is the most preferred, followed by 2, and so on. 
 
masterClassName must specify the fully qualified name of the provider's "master class". 
The provider vendor should supply you this name.
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 Appendix E – Aglet Code 
 
 
AgentApp.java 
/* 
* This program is a mobile agent based application,prototype, 
* that sends a mobile agent to the agent space to perform some 
task 
*/ 
import com.ibm.aglet.*; 
import java.security.*; 
import javax.crypto.SecretKey; 
import javax.crypto.SealedObject; 
import java.net.URL; 
import java.util.Iterator; 
import java.util.ArrayList; 
import java.util.Date; 
import java.awt.event.*; 
import javax.swing.*; 
import java.security.cert.Certificate; 
import java.security.*; 
import javax.crypto.*; 
import java.io.*; 
import javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec; 
public class AgentApp extends Aglet implements ActionListener 
{ 
public mobileUIF mobui ; 
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public JMenuItem crtMenuI , DispaMenuI , setinMenuI; 
public ArrayList clrKeys=null; 
public ArrayList clrInfos=null; 
public ArrayList abahsts=null; 
 
public ArrayList abavhms=null; 
public SignedObject dsDstn=null; 
public Destn dstn; 
public PrivateKey prvk; 
public String agletName = "mobileA"; 
public String alias="kprvirtual"; 
public String password="virtual"; 
public long send =0; 
public long arrived =0; 
public long lived =0; 
public proxyH prxy; 
public URL url; 
public int pt; 
public String prt; 
public void onCreation(Object init) 
{ 
try{ 
prxy = new proxyH(this); 
}catch(Exception ex){ 
System.out.println("The following error occured" + 
ex.toString()); 
ex.printStackTrace(); 
} 
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abavhms = new ArrayList(); 
mobui = new mobileUIF() ; 
crtMenuI = mobui.getCreateMI(); 
crtMenuI.addActionListener(this); 
DispaMenuI = mobui.getDispatchMI(); 
DispaMenuI.addActionListener(this); 
setinMenuI = mobui.getSettingMI(); 
 
setinMenuI.addActionListener(this); 
clrKeys=new ArrayList(); 
clrInfos=new ArrayList(); 
url=getAgletContext().getHostingURL(); 
pt=url.getPort(); 
prt=Integer.toString(pt); 
mobui.show(); 
} 
public boolean handleMessage(Message msg) 
{ 
try{ 
arrived = new Date().getTime(); 
lived = arrived - send; 
prvk=CipherCls.getPrivateKey(alias, 
password.toCharArray(),prt); 
Iterator kitr=((ArrayList)msg.getArg("keys")).iterator(); 
Iterator resitr=((ArrayList)msg.getArg("infos")).iterator(); 
while (kitr.hasNext()) 
{ 
SealedObject sldKey=(SealedObject)kitr.next(); 
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SecretKey secKey=CipherCls.unsealSecretKey(sldKey, prvk); 
clrKeys.add(secKey); 
SealedObject sldRes=(SealedObject)resitr.next(); 
Object res = new Object(); 
res=CipherCls.unsealObject(sldRes, secKey); 
clrInfos.add(res); 
} 
}catch(Exception ex) 
{System.out.println("The following error occured" + 
ex.toString()); 
ex.printStackTrace(); 
return false; 
} 
infoDlg inf= new infoDlg(mobui ,"Information Dialog Box", 
abahsts ,clrInfos ,lived); 
return true; 
} 
public void actionPerformed(ActionEvent event) 
{ 
Object source = event.getSource(); 
if (source == crtMenuI) 
{ 
pathDlg pdlg = new pathDlg(mobui , "Enter The Address of All 
Nodes To Be Visited"); 
pdlg.show(); 
abahsts = (ArrayList)pdlg.getHsts(); 
abavhms = (ArrayList)pdlg.getVHm(); 
return; 
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} 
else if (source == DispaMenuI) 
{ 
try{ 
dstn = new Destn(abahsts , abavhms); 
prvk=CipherCls.getPrivateKey(alias, 
password.toCharArray(),prt); 
dsDstn = CipherCls.signObject(dstn,prvk); 
 
Object[] pass = {prxy,dsDstn}; 
send = new Date().getTime(); 
getAgletContext().createAglet(getCodeBase(), agletName, pass); 
mobui.hide(); 
}catch(Exception ex) 
{ 
System.out.println("The following here here exception types 
captured: " + ex.toString()); 
return; 
} 
return ; 
} 
return; 
} 
} 
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mobileA.java 
/* 
* This program is the proposed mobile agent implementation 
* it carries out its task as pointed out in the proposal 
*/ 
import com.ibm.aglet.*; 
import com.ibm.aglet.event.*; 
import java.security.SignedObject; 
import java.security.PublicKey; 
import javax.crypto.SealedObject; 
import javax.crypto.SecretKey;import java.net.URL; 
import java.net.InetAddress; 
import java.util.Vector; 
import java.util.ArrayList; 
import java.util.Date; 
public class mobileA extends Aglet implements MobilityListener 
{ 
public SignedObject dsDstn; 
public String alias="certvirtual"; 
public int startTrip=1; 
public String agletName="statA" ; 
public AgletProxy slave; 
public Message msgInfo= null; 
public proxyH prxy; 
public URL url; 
public int pt; 
public String prt; 
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public void onCreation(Object init) 
{ 
try{ 
Object[] axcptd=(Object [])init;prxy=(proxyH)axcptd[0]; 
dsDstn=(SignedObject)axcptd[1]; 
Destn dstn=null; 
url=getAgletContext().getHostingURL(); 
pt=url.getPort(); 
prt=Integer.toString(pt); 
dstn=(Destn)CipherCls.getSignedObject(dsDstn, 
CipherCls.getPublicKey(alias,prt)); 
addMobilityListener(this); 
dstn.goToNext(this); 
}catch(Exception ex) 
{ 
System.out.print("The following error occured" + 
ex.toString()); 
ex.printStackTrace(); 
} 
} 
public void onArrival(MobilityEvent event) 
{ 
Destn dstn=null; 
try{ 
url=getAgletContext().getHostingURL(); 
pt=url.getPort();prt=Integer.toString(pt); 
dstn=(Destn)CipherCls.getSignedObject(dsDstn, 
CipherCls.getPublicKey(alias ,prt)); 
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if (dstn.isAtTS(this)) 
{ 
if(startTrip==1) 
{ 
prxy.updateSProxy(getAgletContext().createAglet(getCodeBase( 
), agletName, prxy)); 
startTrip=0; 
dstn.goToNext(this); 
} 
else 
{ 
Message msg= new Message("MobileBackV"); 
msgInfo=(Message)prxy.getSProxy().sendMessage(msg); 
dstn.goBackHome(this); 
} 
}else if (dstn.isAtHome(this)) 
{ 
prxy.getAProxy().sendOnewayMessage(msgInfo); 
dispose(); 
} 
else 
{ 
PublicKey pubk=CipherCls.getPublicKey(alias ,prt); 
SecretKey secKey = CipherCls.generateSessionKey(); 
SealedObject encKey=CipherCls.sealSecretKey(secKey,pubk); 
String tmp1 = "OS Architecture : " + 
System.getProperty("os.arch"); 
String tmp2 = " ; OS Version : " + 
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System.getProperty("os.version"); 
String result=tmp1 + tmp2; 
SealedObject encRes=CipherCls.sealObject(result,secKey); 
Message msg = new Message("MobieAway"); 
msg.setArg("keys", encKey); 
msg.setArg("infos", encRes);prxy.getSProxy().sendOnewayMessage(msg); 
dstn.goToNext(this); 
} 
}catch(Exception ex) 
{ 
System.out.println("The following error occured" + 
ex.toString()); 
ex.printStackTrace(); 
} 
} 
public void onDispatching(MobilityEvent e){} 
public void onReverting(MobilityEvent e){} 
} 
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statA.java 
/* 
*This class implements a temporary storage place as pointed out in the proposal 
*/ 
import com.ibm.aglet.*; 
import com.ibm.aglet.event.*; 
import javax.crypto.SealedObject; 
import java.util.ArrayList; 
public class statA extends Aglet 
{ 
public ArrayList statRes; 
public ArrayList statKeys; 
public proxyH prxy; 
public void onCreation(Object init) 
{ 
try{ 
prxy = (proxyH)init; 
statKeys=new ArrayList(); 
statRes=new ArrayList(); 
prxy.updateSProxy(getProxy()); 
}catch(Exception ex) 
{ 
System.out.println(ex.toString()); 
}} 
public boolean handleMessage(Message msg){ 
if (msg.sameKind("MobieAway")) 
{ 
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try{ 
SealedObject sos=(SealedObject)msg.getArg("keys"); 
statKeys.add(sos); 
SealedObject sor=(SealedObject)msg.getArg("infos"); 
statRes.add(sor); 
}catch(Exception ex) 
{ 
System.out.print("The following error occured"+ 
ex.toString()); 
ex.printStackTrace(); 
} 
return true; 
} 
else if(msg.sameKind("MobileBackV")) 
{ 
try{ 
Message newmsg = new Message("MobileH"); 
newmsg.setArg("keys", statKeys); 
newmsg.setArg("infos", statRes);msg.sendReply(newmsg); 
}catch(Exception ex) 
{ 
System.out.print("The following error occured"+ 
ex.toString()); 
ex.printStackTrace(); 
} 
return true; 
} 
return false;}
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 Appendix F – Sketch Technique 
and Detection Algorithm Codes 
 
Divergence Measures Code 
clear all 
close all 
f=fopen('osmansalem','w'); 
% a = 40; b = 100; 
 
%beta=[-1 -0.75 -0.5 -0.25 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.25 1.5 1.75 2 2.25 2.5 2.75 3 3.25 3.5 3.75 4 4.25 
4.5 4.75 5 5.25 5.5 5.75 6] 
%beta=2.25 
%beta=[18:19] 
 
% S=100 
IScore=[] 
JEAN=[] 
%load ALI.dat 
%P=ALI 
 
 
A=1024 
B=511 
 
 
file_name='./jean1.dat' 
 
%load -ascii ./2048/jean.dat 
%NB_SYN = jean 
fid = fopen (file_name,'r'); 
 for j=1:B 
 for i=1:A 
    NB_SYN(j,i) = fscanf(fid,'%e',1);  
 end 
% % fscanf(fid,'%s',1);  
 end 
 
for i=1:B 
    for j=1:A 
     
    P(i,j)= NB_SYN(i,j)./sum(NB_SYN(i,:)); 
    end 
end 
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%% 
 %Chi-square 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%% 
  
    for i=1:size(P,1)-1  
      for j=1:size(P,2)  
        if  (P(i+1,j) ~= 0  && P(i,j) ~= 0)  
            Rapport(i,j) = (P(i+1,j)-P(i,j))^2/(P(i,j)); 
            
 
        else Rapport(i,j) = 0; 
        end 
      end 
   
        
    end  
 
    for i=1:size(Rapport,1) 
         X(i)=sum(Rapport(i,:) ); 
          
         IScore=[IScore X(i)]; 
    end 
       
     figure(1) 
     axes('FontSize',18) 
     plot(IScore,'LineWidth',1.5); 
      
     axis([1 509 0 250]) 
     xlabel('Time(min)'); 
     ylabel('Chi-square Divergence');      
       
      
      
     tajer=0 
for makke=10:10 
tajer = tajer + 1; 
     for i=1:length(IScore)-1 
            diff(1,i)=IScore(i+1) - IScore(i);  
     end 
    ho=[] 
    meo= mean(IScore(1:9)); 
             varo= var(IScore(1:9));    
     ho=[ho meo+2*sqrt(varo)]; 
     distosman=IScore(1:9) 
     for i=10:length(IScore) 
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            meo= mean(distosman(1:(i-1))); 
             varo= var(distosman(1:(i-1))); 
              
     ho=[ho (makke*meo)+3*sqrt(varo)]; 
     if (IScore(i) < ho(end)) 
         distosman(i)=IScore(i); 
     else 
         distosman(i)=distosman(i-1) 
     end 
      
    end 
      
  %figure(tajer); 
   %plot(dists); 
    hold on 
    T=9:510 
    plot(T,ho,'r--','LineWidth',1.5) 
    legend('Chi-square Divergence','Threshold'); 
     box on  
     print -depsc2 CS.eps 
end 
 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%% 
%Hellinger distance 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%% 
   HD1=[];   
  for i=1:size(P,1)-1  
      for j=1:size(P,2)  
        %if  (P(i+1,j) ~= 0  && P(i,j) ~= 0)  
            HD(i,j) = (sqrt(P(i+1,j))-sqrt(P(i,j)))^2; 
            
 
        %else Rapport(i,j) = 0; 
        end 
      end 
   
             
 
    for i=1:size(HD,1) 
         Y(i)=0.5*sum(HD(i,:) ); 
          
         HD1=[HD1 Y(i)]; 
    end 
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     figure(2) 
     axes('FontSize',18) 
     plot(HD1,'LineWidth',1.5); 
      
     axis([0 508 0 0.5]) 
     xlabel('Time(min)'); 
     ylabel('Hellinger Distance');      
     
  
 tajer=0 
for makke=1:1 
tajer = tajer + 1; 
     for i=1:length(HD1)-1 
            diff(1,i)=HD1(i+1) - HD1(i);  
     end 
    ho=[] 
    meo= mean(HD1(1:9)); 
             varo= var(HD1(1:9));    
     ho=[ho meo+2*sqrt(varo)]; 
     distosman=HD1(1:9) 
     for i=10:length(HD1) 
            meo= mean(distosman(1:(i-1))); 
             varo= var(distosman(1:(i-1))); 
              
     ho=[ho (makke*meo)+3*sqrt(varo)]; 
     if (HD1(i) < ho(end)) 
         distosman(i)=HD1(i); 
     else 
         distosman(i)=distosman(i-1) 
     end 
      
    end 
      
  %figure(tajer); 
   %plot(dists); 
    hold on 
    T=9:510 
    plot(T,ho,'r--','LineWidth',1.5) 
    legend('Hellinger Distance','Threshold'); 
     box on  
     print -depsc2 HD.eps 
end 
   
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%% 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%% 
  
    
 %JEAN=[JEAN IScore'] 
    %IScore=[] 
 
%end 
% [XX,YY]=meshgrid(beta, 1:99) 
% mesh(XX,YY,JEAN) 
% axis([5 6 0 100 0 10^13]) 
 
 
%  
% hold on 
% %  apprentissage 
%  
% mBr=zeros(1,length(IScore)+1); 
% Err=zeros(1,length(IScore)+1); 
% S=zeros(1,length(IScore)+1); 
% H=zeros(1,length(IScore)+1); 
%  
% mBr(1)=0 
% mBr(2)= IScore(1); 
% mBr(3)=mBr(2); 
% Err(3)=abs(mBr(3)-IScore(3)); 
% S(3)=0.25*Err(2);      
% H(3)=5*mBr(3)+S(3);   %  estimation 
%  
%  
% for i=4:length(IScore) 
%     mBr(i)=(7/8)*mBr(i-1)+(1/8)*IScore(i-1); 
%     Err(i)=abs(mBr(i)-IScore(i)); 
%     S(i)=0.75*S(i-1) + 0.25*Err(i-1); 
%     H(i)=2*mBr(i)+1*S(i); 
%      
% end 
%   
%   
% plot(H,'r') 
 
 
return 
 
 
%PD2= [100 100 100 98 95 85 74 52 20 0 0 0 0 0 ] 
PD1=[100 100 100 100 98 95 91 80 70 45 30 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] 
FR1=[100 95  90  80  50 23 15 6  2  1  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]  
x=0:2:18 
figure(1) 
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plot(PD1,'r*-') 
hold on 
plot(FR1,'bo-') 
plot(PD2,'bo-'); 
set(gca,'XTickLabel', 0:2:20) 
xlabel('Threshold h'); 
ylabel('True positive/False positive'); 
legend('True positive','False detection'); 
FAR1=(FR1./100) 
PDR1=PD1./100 
figure(2) 
plot(FAR1, PDR1,'ro-') 
xlabel('False positive'); 
ylabel('True positive'); 
set(gca,'XTickLabel', 0:10:100) 
legend('True positive'); 
 
%return 
figure(3) 
PD2=[100 100 98 95 91 82 75 66 48 29 14 5 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]  
FR2=[100 80  50 15 5  2  1  0  0  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] 
x=0:2:18 
%figure(1) 
plot(PD2,'r*-') 
hold on 
plot(FR2,'bo-') 
set(gca,'XTickLabel', 0:2:20) 
xlabel('Threshold h'); 
ylabel('True positive/False positive'); 
legend('True positive','False detection'); 
FAR2=(FR2./100) 
PDR2=PD2./100 
figure(4) 
plot(FAR2, PDR2,'ro-') 
hold on 
plot(FAR1,PDR1,'bo-'); 
xlabel('False positive'); 
ylabel('True positive'); 
set(gca,'XTickLabel', 0:10:100) 
legend('True positive'); 
 
 
figure(5) 
PD3=[85   85 82  80  77  65 55  46  31 10  2  0  0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]  
FR3=[100 100 90  85  77  55 40  36  22 18  13 13 11 9 8 7 5 5 5 5 5] 
x=0:2:18 
%figure(1) 
plot(PD3,'r*-') 
hold on 
plot(FR3,'bo-') 
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set(gca,'XTickLabel', 0:2:20) 
xlabel('Threshold h'); 
ylabel('True positive/False positive'); 
legend('True positive','False detection'); 
FAR3=(FR3./100) 
PDR3=PD3./100 
figure(6) 
plot(FAR2, PDR2,'ro-') 
hold on 
plot(FAR1,PDR1,'bo-'); 
hold on 
plot(FAR3,PDR3,'bo-'); 
xlabel('False positive'); 
ylabel('True positive'); 
set(gca,'XTickLabel', 0:10:100) 
legend('True positive'); 
 
return 
f=fopen('osmansalem','w'); 
for i=1:21  
     
    fprintf(f,'%d\t %d \t %d \t %e \t %e \t %d \t %d \t %e \t %e \n', i-
1,PD1(i),FR1(i),PDR1(i),FAR1(i),PD2(i),FR2(i),PDR2(i),FAR2(i)); 
end  
fclose(f); 
 
 
Attack Generator 
include <iostream> 
#include <string> 
#include <cstdlib> 
#include <cmath> 
#include <fstream> 
#include <sstream> 
#include <iomanip> 
#include <cstdio> 
#include <cstdlib> /* for double = atof() and atoi() functions */ 
 
#include <cstring> 
#include <cmath> 
 
 
//------------------------------------------------- 
// Main program 
//------------------------------------------------- 
 
typedef struct 
{ 
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 int timestamp_second; 
 int timestamp_float_part; 
 int ipv4_source; 
 int src_port; 
 int ipv4_dest; 
 int dest_port; 
 int ip_len; 
 int proto; 
 int flags_tcp; 
} oscarflow_id; 
 
using namespace std; 
 
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) 
{ 
//------------------------------------------------- 
// Initialisation des variables 
//------------------------------------------------- 
char line[1500],line2[1500]; 
int retVal; 
 double tsec, tusec,tfsec, inter_tsec; 
  
 int ipv4_src[4], ipv4_dst[4]; 
 int sport,dport; 
 int volume, fenetre,nseq, nack; 
 char flags, c; 
 int len, flag; 
 int syn, fin,rst; 
 oscarflow_id ofp; 
 int nomber; 
 int i; 
        int x, z; 
 char proto; 
        string inputLine, stipv4_src, stipv4_dst; // Input line 
 
 ifstream inputFile; 
  ofstream outputFile; 
 char filename[100]; 
 int interval_cnt=31 ; 
 
        string attack="1271300401.260961 222.199.15.145 10.0.0.1 18669 80 T S"; 
 
 
        ofstream attackfile; 
 
  
   for (z=1;z<=10;z++) 
{ 
 sprintf(filename,"attack%d",interval_cnt); 
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        attackfile.open(filename); 
 
        cout << setprecision(6) ; 
 cout.setf(ios::fixed,ios::floatfield); 
       
            for (x=1;x<15000;x++) 
 
          attackfile << attack<< endl; 
           
         attackfile.close(); 
interval_cnt++; 
 
} 
     attackfile.close(); 
 
return 0; 
} 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sketch 
/****************************************************************************/ 
/** NADA-CRESBALA V1.0 Gamma                                               **/ 
/** Implementation of Counting REversible Sketch Based At Linear Algebra   **/ 
/**    as Network Anomaly Detection Algorithm      **/ 
/**    for DoS/DDoS Attack                                **/ 
/** Developed by Osman Salem, March 2007         **/ 
/** Copyright (c) 2007 ENST Bretagne. All rights reserved.                 **/ 
/**                                                                        **/ 
/** The NADA-CRESBALA software package is distributed in open-source       **/ 
/** under the terms of the GNU general public license agreement.           **/ 
/** To document the usage of NADA-cresbala, we ask each user to cite our   **/ 
/** scientific publications mentioned on our Web site.                     **/ 
/****************************************************************************/ 
 
/******************************************************************** 
LAST Updated: Sunday  18/03/2007 Ã  5:06 
This work is under evaluation phase, and its distribution is not allowed for  
any organisation or any person without the permission of the author 
 
Great thanks to Frederic grasset for his indenial help in the developpement of this code 
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and I wish that he had enjoy his black pizza 
*********************************************************************/ 
 
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
//Counting REversible Sketch Based At Linear Algebra 
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
#include <iostream> 
#include <stdio.h> 
#include <stdlib.h>   /*for rand() and srand() */ 
#include <malloc.h> 
#include <inttypes.h> 
#include <string.h> 
#include <unistd.h> 
#include <math.h> 
#include <time.h> 
#include <limits.h>   /* for time() function */ 
#include <sys/socket.h> 
#include <netinet/in.h> 
#include <arpa/inet.h> 
#include "includes/cresbala.h" 
using namespace std; 
 
const uint64_t prime = (((uint64_t)1)<<61)-1; 
const uint64_t lowones = (((uint64_t)1)<<32)-1; 
 
uint64_t low32of64(uint64_t x) { return(x&lowones); } 
uint64_t high32of64(uint64_t x) { return(x>>32); } 
 
uint64_t MultAddMod(uint64_t x, uint64_t a, uint64_t b) { 
 // Compute (ax+b)%prime + possibly 2*prime using prime=2^61-1 
  
 uint64_t a0 = low32of64(a)*x; 
 uint64_t a1 = high32of64(a)*x; 
 uint64_t c0 = a0+(a1<<32); 
 uint64_t c1 = (a0>>32)+a1; 
 uint64_t c = (c0&prime)+(c1>>29)+b; 
 return(c); 
} 
 
/************************************************************************/ 
/* Reversible sketches based on linear algebra                          */ 
/************************************************************************/ 
cresbala * CRES_Init(uint64_t width, int depth, int U) 
{      
 cresbala * cm; 
 int i,j,k; 
 char t[100]; 
 FILE *fin[10], *infin; 
 uint64_t a,b; 
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 srand(time(NULL)); 
  if (U <=0 || U > P) return(NULL);   
 cm=(cresbala *) malloc(sizeof(cresbala)); 
 if (cm) 
 { 
  cm->totale.totale = 0;   
        cm->depth=depth; 
        cm->width=width; 
        cm->U=U; 
        cm->counts=(counter **)calloc(cm->depth,sizeof(counter *)); 
          for (i=0;i < cm->width;i++) 
                  { 
                         cm->counts[i]=(counter *)calloc(cm->width,sizeof(counter)); 
                  } 
  cm->prob=(float **)calloc(cm->depth,sizeof(float *)); 
          for (i=0;i < cm->width;i++) 
                  { 
                         cm->prob[i]=(float *)calloc(cm->width,sizeof(float)); 
                  } 
   cm->hasha=(uint64_t *)calloc(cm->depth,sizeof(uint64_t)); 
   cm->hashb=(uint64_t *)calloc(cm->depth,sizeof(uint64_t )); 
  if (cm->counts && cm->hasha && cm->hashb && cm->counts[0]) 
  { 
    for (j=0;j<depth;j++) 
      { 
   b=((((uint64_t)rand())<<32)+((uint64_t)rand()))%prime; 
   do {a=((((uint64_t)rand())<<32)+((uint64_t)rand()))%prime;} 
while(a == 0); 
        cm->hasha[j]= a; 
        cm->hashb[j]=((((uint64_t)rand())<<32)+((uint64_t)rand()))%prime; 
        // pick the hash functions 
         
      } 
  for (i = 0; i < cm->depth; i++)  
       for (j = 0; j < cm->width; j++) 
          { 
      cm->counts[i][j].X = 0; 
   for (k = 0; k < 5; k++)  
       cm->counts[i][j].WIND[k]=0; 
   } 
  } 
      else cm=NULL; 
    } 
  return cm; 
} 
 
//******************************************************************************/ 
/* Initial update function for sketch                             */ 
/*******************************************************************************/ 
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void CRES_Update(cresbala *cm, uint64_t item, uint32_t differ) 
{ 
  
 int i,j; 
 uint64_t bjectv=0; 
 uint32_t test; 
 if (cm==NULL) return; 
 cm->totale.totale +=  differ; 
 
  
 /*char tchr[1500]; 
 FILE *fosman; 
 sprintf(tchr,"sketchosman"); 
 fosman=fopen(tchr,"a");*/ 
  
 
 
 for (i = 0 ; i < cm->depth; i++) 
 { 
  //test = (MultAddMod(item,cm->hasha[i], cm-
>hashb[i])%prime)%(cm->width); 
  //fprintf(fosman, "item=%llu \t hash=%u\n",item,test ); 
  cm->counts[i][(MultAddMod(item,cm->hasha[i], cm-
>hashb[i])%prime)%(cm->width)].X += differ; 
 } 
  //fprintf(fosman, "\n\n\n"); 
  //fclose(fosman); 
return; 
} 
 
//******************************************************************************/ 
/* Initial update function for sketch                             */ 
/*******************************************************************************/ 
 
 
void Calc_Proba(cresbala *cm) 
{ 
 FILE *fileid1, *fd; 
 fileid1=fopen("kldiv1.dat","a"); 
 fd = fopen("jean.dat","a"); 
 int i,j; 
 for (i = 0; i < cm->depth; i++)  
  for (j = 0; j < cm->width; j++) 
  { 
  if (cm->totale.totale) 
  cm->prob[i][j]= (float)cm->counts[i][j].X/(cm->totale.totale); 
  else printf("error\n"); 
  } 
fprintf(stdout,"%ld \t", cm->width); 
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 for (j = 0; j < cm->width; j++) 
  fprintf(fd,"%u ",cm->counts[1][j].X); 
 fprintf(fd,"\n"); 
 
 fprintf(fileid1,"%lld \t", cm->totale.totale); 
 for (i = 0; i < cm->depth; i++)  
  { 
  for (j = 0; j < cm->width; j++) 
    fprintf(fileid1,"%u \t", cm->counts[i][j].X); 
    fprintf(fileid1,"\n"); 
  } 
 fclose(fileid1); 
fclose(fd); 
 
return; 
} 
 
 
void print_file(cresbala *cm) 
{ 
 static int ik = 1; 
 FILE *fileid1; 
 char tch[1500]; 
 sprintf(tch,"./osman/blaise%03d",ik); 
 fileid1=fopen(tch,"w"); 
 int i,j; 
 for (i = 0; i < cm->depth; i++)  
  { 
  for (j = 0; j < cm->width; j++) 
   { 
   fprintf(fileid1, "%u ",cm->counts[i][j].X); 
   } 
  fprintf(fileid1,"\n"); 
  } 
 fclose(fileid1); 
 ik++; 
return; 
} 
 
 
int CRES_Est(cresbala * cm1, cresbala * cm2 ) 
{ 
 static int i1 = 0; 
 static int osman=0; 
 double R = 0, Q= 0; 
   unsigned int X, compt; 
 double alarm[32]={0}; 
 float KLDiv[5]={0}; 
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 FILE *fileid, *fileid1; 
 fileid=fopen("kldiv.dat","a"); 
 fileid1=fopen("ALI.dat","a"); 
 uint64_t key; 
    uint64_t i,j,k,t,t1, r, result = 0, bjectv = 0; 
   //double seuil[3], threshold_stat[3][3]={{150,125,100},{100,75,50 },{100,75,25}}; 
 uint64_t seuil[3];//1000000000ULL; 
 uint64_t thresh=UINT_MAX, threshold_stat[3]; 
   node *Lghp[3]; 
   if (!cm1 && !cm2) return 0; 
 srand(time(NULL)); 
 int limit = 3; 
 i=rand()%limit; 
 compt = 0; 
 
  
   
 for (i = 0; i < cm1->depth; i++)  
  { 
   for (j = 0; j < cm1->width; j++) 
   { 
   R = cm1->prob[i][j]; 
   Q = cm2->prob[i][j]; 
   //R= sqrt(R); 
   //Q= sqrt(Q); 
   //fprintf(fileid,"R=%f \t Q=%f \t ", R,Q); 
    if (R && Q) 
    { 
     KLDiv[i] += R*log(R/Q);// - Q*log10(R)); 
     //KLDiv[i] += 0.5*pow(R-Q,2) ; 
 
    } 
    /*else 
     KLDiv[i] += 0;*/ 
 
   } 
   //fprintf(fileid,"\n"); 
  } 
double totale_ali = 0; 
 for (j = 0; j < cm2->width; j++) 
   { 
   R= cm2->prob[1][j]; //(double)cm1->counts[1][j].X/(cm1-
>totale.totale); 
   //if (R) 
    { 
   fprintf(fileid1,"%e ", R); 
   totale_ali += R; 
    } 
   } 
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 cout << "La somme totale de la ligne "<< j <<" =  " << totale_ali <<endl; 
 totale_ali = 0; 
 fprintf(fileid1,"\n"); 
  
 
 fprintf(fileid,"%d \t %lld \t %lld \t ", osman++, cm1->totale.totale, cm2-
>totale.totale); 
 for (i = 0; i < cm1->depth; i++)  
  fprintf(fileid,"%f \t ", KLDiv[i]); 
 fprintf(fileid,"\n"); 
 fclose(fileid); 
  
 //exit; 
  cm1->totale.totale = cm2->totale.totale; 
  cm2->totale.totale = 0; 
  for (i = 0; i < cm1->depth; i++)  
   for (j = 0; j < cm1->width; j++) 
   { 
     
    cm1->counts[i][j].X =cm2->counts[i][j].X; 
    cm2->counts[i][j].X = 0; 
    cm1->prob[i][j]= cm2->prob[i][j]; 
    cm2->prob[i][j]=0; 
     
   } 
   
return 0; 
 
} 
 
//******************************************************************************/ 
/* Initial update function for sketch                             */ 
/*******************************************************************************/ 
 
 
 
/******************************************************************************/ 
/* Free allocated memory for sketch           */ 
/******************************************************************************/ 
void CRES_Destroy(cresbala * cm) 
{      
 int i,j; 
 if (!cm) return; 
 for (i=0;i<cm->depth;i++) 
  {   
    free(cm->counts[i]); 
  } 
 free(cm->counts); 
 cm->counts=NULL; 
 free(cm->hasha); 
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 free(cm->hashb); 
 cm->hasha=NULL; 
 cm->hashb=NULL; 
        free(cm);   
 cm=NULL; 
} 
/*************************************************************************************************
********/ 
/* Duplicate sketch :     // create a new sketch with the same parameters as an existing 
one             */ 
/*************************************************************************************************
********/ 
cresbala * CRES_Copy(cresbala * cmold) 
{      
  cresbala * cm; 
  int i,j; 
  if (!cmold) return(NULL); 
  cm=(cresbala *) malloc(sizeof(cresbala)); 
  if (cm) 
    { 
 cm->totale.totale=cmold->totale.totale;  
 cm->depth=cmold->depth; 
       cm->width=cmold->width; 
       cm->U=cmold->U; 
 
 cm->counts=(counter **)calloc(sizeof(counter *),cm->depth); 
      for (i=0;i<cm->depth;i++) 
    { 
      cm->counts[i]=(counter *)calloc(sizeof(counter ),cm->width); 
       
    } 
 cm->prob=(float **)calloc(cm->depth,sizeof(float *)); 
  for (j=0;i<cm->width;i++) 
          { 
                 cm->prob[i]=(float *)calloc(cm->width,sizeof(float)); 
          } 
 cm->hasha=(uint64_t *)calloc(cm->depth,sizeof(uint64_t)); 
 cm->hashb=(uint64_t *)calloc(cm->depth,sizeof(uint64_t )); 
  
 for (i=0;i<cm->depth;i++) 
  for (j=0;j<cm->width;j++){ 
   cm->counts[i][j].X=cmold->counts[i][j].X;    
   cm->prob[i][j]=cmold->prob[i][j]; 
  }      
 
 for (i=0;i<cm->depth;i++) 
   { 
      cm->hasha[i]=cmold->hasha[i]; 
  cm->hashb[i]=cmold->hashb[i]; 
 } 
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   } 
      else cm=NULL; 
 
  return cm; 
} 
 
/******************************************************************************/ 
/* RESET counting sketch           */ 
/******************************************************************************/ 
int CRES_Reset(cresbala *cm) 
{ 
 int i,j; 
 if (cm==NULL) return 0; 
 cm->totale.totale = 0; 
 for (i=0;i<cm->depth;i++) 
  for (j=0;j<cm->width;j++){ 
   cm->counts[i][j].X= 0; 
   cm->prob[i][j]= 0; 
   } 
 return 1; 
} 
 
 
 
 
ROC 
 
clear all 
close all 
figure(1) 
axes('FontSize',18) 
 
%Jensen-Shannon ROC 
DR=[100 100 83 75 66 41 25 16 8 0]  
FAR=[100 40 28 26 20 13 0 0 0 0] 
plot(FAR,DR,'b--','LineWidth',4) 
 
axis([0 100 0 105]) 
xlabel('False Alarm Rate'); 
ylabel('Detection Rate'); 
 
 
hold on 
%beta=0.5, HD ROC 
PD=[100 100 91 83 75 58 41 25 16 8 0]  
FR=[100 43 35 23 18 12 8 0 0 0 0] 
plot(FR,PD,'r:','LineWidth',4) 
 
hold on 
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%beta=1, KL ROC 
PD=[100 100 91 83 75 66 58 50 41 33 25 16 8 0]  
FR=[100 40 31 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] 
plot(FR,PD,'g--','LineWidth',4) 
 
hold on 
%beta=1.5 ROC 
PD=[100 100 91 83 75 66 58 50 41 33 25 16 8 0]  
FR=[100 25 21 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] 
plot(FR,PD,'m-.','LineWidth',4) 
 
hold on 
%beta=2, CS ROC 
PD=[100 100 91 83 75 66 58 50 41 33 25 16 8 0]  
FR=[100 20 17 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] 
plot(FR,PD,'c-','LineWidth',4) 
 
hold on 
%beta=2.5 ROC 
PD=[100 100 91 83 75 66 58 50 41 33 25 16 8 0]  
FR=[100 13 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0] 
plot(FR,PD,'k-','LineWidth',4) 
 
legend('JSD','Beta=0.5 (HD)','Beta=1 (KLD)','Beta=1.5','Beta=2 (CSD)','Beta=2.5'); 
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 Appendix G – UPR16 Form 
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